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PUTTING STARCH IN EUROPEAN EFFORTS
TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING
SCOTTE. MORTMAN
INTRODUCTION
In forming a single financial market, the European Community
("EC") has taken significant steps toward removing the barriers that im-
pede the free movement of goods, services, and workers among nations.
The removal of these barriers has provided criminals with the opportu-
nity to utilize the unified European financial market in concealing the
source of the proceeds from their illegal activities.1 By transferring the
proceeds derived from criminal activities, such as drug trafficking or ter-
rorism, through financial2 and credit institutions3 in different European
nations, criminals can make these proceeds appear to be the result of
legitimate business activities.4 This process of using legitimate institu-
tions to conceal the source of illegitimate gains is commonly known as
money laundering.5
The ability to launder money without being detected by law enforce-
ment authorities promotes criminal activity by providing an attractive
economic incentive. Increased levels of drug trafficking and other forms
of organized crime are partially the result of successful attempts at
money laundering.6 Opportunities for success are augmented when
1. As stated by EC Commissioner Leon Brittan, "[lit [the final lifting of restrictions
on capital movements for most European Community nations] opens new possibilities for
the use of the international financial system to launder criminal funds related to drug
dealing, terrorism or other organized crime." EC to Take Action Against Money Laun-
dering, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Jan. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
2. See infra note 21.
3. See infra note 22.
4. The Financial Action Task Force, established by the Group of Seven, has esti-
mated that drug sales in Europe and the United States amount to S122 billion annually,
from which nearly $85 billion are profits available to be laundered through financial mar-
kets. See Lascelles, Money Laundering Under Siege, Fin. Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at 39,
col. 5. According to a report submitted to the European Parliament, S100 billion in drug
proceeds is laundered across the world each year. See 100 Billion Dollars in Drug Money
Laundered Every Year: EC, Agence France Presse, Oct. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
5. For conceptual purposes, money laundering is divided frequently into three
stages--placement, layering, and integration. See P. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money From
Reaching The Wash Cycle. A Guide To The Bank Secrecy Act, 108 Banking LJ. 230, 231
(1991). "Placement is the physical disposal of bulk cash proceeds into a financial institu-
tion. Layering is the process of transferring these funds among various accounts through
a series of complex financial transactions that are intended, to the greatest extent possible,
to separate these funds from their original sources. Finally, integration is the process of
shifting the laundered funds to legitimate organizations that have no apparent link to
organized crime." Id It is generally agreed that money laundering is most easily de-
tected, and thereby prevented, at the initial placement stage. See id
6. See id. at 230; Commission Proposal for a Council Directive, Explanatory Memo-
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money launderers are able to disguise the source of their proceeds in an
integrated international economic context.7 In addition to facilitating
criminal activity, laundering criminal proceeds through financial institu-
tions can undermine the stability and integrity of these institutions and
jeopardize public confidence in the banking system as a whole.'
Recently, in an effort to combat international money laundering, Euro-
pean nations have been participating in a variety of international and
national fora aimed at curbing money laundering. This European effort
is, in part, a response to increasing global drug trafficking, pressure by
the United States to reform, and recent money-laundering scandals in-
volving European financial institutions and public officials.9 Europeans
have also been motivated by their concern for maintaining the stability
and integrity of European financial institutions as they develop a single
market for financial services and promote liberal capital movement
within Europe. 10
This Note will explore efforts to combat money laundering in Europe.
Part I reviews recent international efforts, such as the EC Directive,
designed to curb money laundering in Europe. Part II examines recent
legislation and regulations adopted by European nations to reduce
money laundering within their borders. Part III analyzes these interna-
tional and national efforts to combat money laundering and develops a
two-pronged model to describe them. This model focuses on legal meas-
ures and the duties of financial institutions to prevent money laundering.
Part III also addresses alternative measures that may prove effective in
preventing money laundering in Europe. Finally, this Note concludes
that implementation of the EC Directive and other international agree-
randum, COM(90)106 final at 2 [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum]. As EC Com-
missioner Brittan stated, "[E]ffective action against money laundering has a key role to
play in the continuing struggle against the evils of international drug dealing." EC To
Take Action Against Money Laundering, supra note 1.
7. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 6, at 2. The freer movement of capital
and financial services between European nations and the removal of exchange controls
have led to an increase in European money laundering since "the international context
can easily complicate the process of tracing the origin of... funds." See Money Launder-
ing Directive Drafted, Fin. Reg. Rep., Dec. 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
8. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 6, at 4; Zagaris & Bornheim, Coopera-
tion In Fight Against Money Laundering In Context Of European Community Integration,
[Jan.-June] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 119 (Jan. 22, 1990). "To ensure the stability
and integrity of the financial system itself, more attention has been given recently to the
conduct and reputation of credit and financial institutions and to their involvement in
money laundering." Money Laundering Directive Drafted, supra note 7.
9. See Banoun & Lerner, International Drive Against Laundering, Money Launder-
ing L. Rep., Jun. 1991, at 3; Nowinski and Bagge, Moves to Curb Money Laundering, Fin.
Times, Jan. 31, 1991, at 29, col. 1; Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 119. The laun-
dering of proceeds by organized criminal groups operating in Europe has also increased
over recent years as more groups have sprung up to handle the larger drug trade. See
Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 122.
10. See Banoun & Lerner, supra note 9, at 3; Nowinski & Bagge, supra note 9, at 29;
Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 119.
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ments through national legislative and regulatory measures should signif-
icantly reduce the level of money laundering in Europe.
I. RECENT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS To CONTROL MONEY
LAUNDERING IN EUROPE
A. EC Council Directive
The most recent effort designed to prevent the use of the European
financial system for the purpose of money laundering is EC Council Di-
rective 91/308. This Directive, advanced under Article 57 and Article
100a of the EEC Treaty,12 was adopted by the EC on June 10, 1991.1 3 In
drafting this Directive, the EC recognized that the most effective method
of curbing money laundering is through an organized coordinated effort
among European nations. 4 The Directive is intended to preclude indi-
vidual nations from adopting initiatives contrary to a liberal and inte-
grated European financial market. 5
The two principal aims of the Directive are criminalizing money laun-
dering in EC member states and increasing cooperation among member
states in investigating and prosecuting money launderers. 6 The Direc-
tive requires each member state to enact national legislation criminaliz-
11. See Council Directive 91/308, 1991 OJ. (L 166) 77.
12. See id. The EEC Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome, created the EEC in
1957 and established the fundamental principles of the Community. See W. Rawlinson &
M. P. Cornwell-Kelly, European Community Law 2 (1990). These principles included
the freedom to move goods, workers, and capital and to provide services across national
borders within the EEC. See id
13. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, at 77. The Directive was first pro-
posed by the EC Commission to the Council Ministers in March of 1990. See Commis-
sion Proposal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for
the Purpose of Money Laundering, 1990 O.J. (C 106) 6. After review by the Economic
and Social Committee and the European Parliament, the amended Directive was again
submitted by the Commission to the Council. See Opinion on the Proposal for a Council
Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering, 1990 OJ. (C 332) 86; Commission Amendment to the Proposal for a Coun-
cil Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering, 1990 O.J. (C 319) 9. The Council formally agreed on and approved a com-
mon position regarding the Directive in February 1991, and the final amendments prior
to adoption of the Directive were reported in May of that year. See Re-examined Propo-
sal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose
of Money Laundering, COM(91)182 final. For a brief but informative description of the
various above-mentioned political institutions in the EC, see T.C. Hartley, The Founda-
tions of European Community Law 8-21 (1981).
14. "Measures exclusively adopted at a national level, without taking account of in-
ternational coordination and cooperation, would have very limited effects." Council Di-
rective 91/308, supra note 11, at 78.
15. See id. at 77; West's European Update, Banking and Financial Services, 1991 WVL
11696 (D.R.T.), at 60, available in WESTLAW, Eurupdate Database [hereinafter
Eurupdate].
16. See Coopers & Lybrand, Financial Services, 1991 Euroscope 1, at '4, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurscp File [hereinafter Euroscope]. See generally Council Di-
rective 91/308, supra note 11 (detailing aims of Directive).
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ing money laundering as defined in the Directive. 7 The Directive
derives its definition of money laundering from the Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("Vienna
Convention") adopted by the United Nations in December 1988.18 The
Directive defines money laundering to include the laundering of proceeds
from criminal activities which occurred in another member state or in a
third country that is not part of the EC. 9 Significantly, the Directive
encourages member states to expand, through national legislation, the
definition of "criminal activity" to include crimes not specified in the
Vienna Convention.2°
17. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, at 79. Arguing that the European
Commission lacked authority, several member states resisted the Commission's efforts to
propose criminal legislation directly binding the member states. See Eurupdate, supra
note 15, at 64; Banking: ESC Call for Tougher Measures Against Money Laundering, Eur.
Rep., Oct. 27, 1990, at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. To satisfy
the resistant member states and achieve a result consistent with that contained in the
proposal, the Commission removed criminal sanctions from the Directive and replaced
the provision with an inter-governmental declaration by member states obligating each
state to enact such sanctions at the national level. See Banking: Money Laundering Di-
rective Before Parliament For Second Reading, Eur. Rep., Apr. 17, 1991, at 6, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; EC Finance Ministers Reach Accord To Estab-
lish Money Laundering Rules, BNA Int'l Fin. Daily, Jan. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter EC Finance]. This approach to criminaliza-
tion had previously been used by the EC in its insider trading Directive. See Note,
Outside Investors: A New Breed of Insider Traders?, in Annual Survey of Financial Insti-
tutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L.
Rev. S319, S325-28 (1992).
18. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, at 83. As stated in the Directive,
"money laundering" is defined as
the following conduct when committed intentionally:
- the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assist-
ing any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the
legal consequences of his action,
- the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity,
- the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt,
that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of partici-
pation in such activity,
- participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abet-
ting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions men-
tioned in the foregoing paragraphs.
Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of the abovementioned
activities may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
Id., art. 1, at 79.
19. See id.
20. See id. Since all member states did not agree that money laundering as defined in
the Directive should include the proceeds of criminal activity other than drug trafficking,
the extension of this definition to include other crimes was left to the discretion of each
member state. See Council of Europe Follows Slow Pace in Reaching Laundering Agree-
ment, Money Laundering Alert, March, 1991, at 7, available in LEXIS, World Library,
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In addition to compelling criminalization, the Directive seeks to re-
duce money laundering by imposing certain duties on financial institu-
tions21 and credit institutions.' Pursuant to the Directive, credit and
financial institutions in member states are required to obtain identifica-
tion from their customers upon entering into a business relationship.' 3
These institutions also must obtain identification each time a customer
engages in a transaction involving a sum equal to or greater than 15,000
ECU (approximately $18,500 U.S.).24 Customer identification is re-
quired for transactions below the threshold amount whenever there is a
suspicion of money laundering.25 In cases where it appears that a cus-
tomer is acting on another's behalf, credit and financial institutions must
take reasonable measures to obtain the identity of the person on whose
ALLWLD File [hereinafter Council of Europe]. Some member states, however, did not
support this decision and urged instead that the definition in the Directive directly en-
compass terrorism and other serious crimes. See id.
21. As defined in EC Council Directive 89/646, a financial institution is "an under-
taking other than a credit institution the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings
or to carry on one or more of the activities listed in... the Annex." Council Directive
89/646, art. 1, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, 3. The activities referred to in the Annex include
lending, financial leasing, money transmission services, issuing and administering means
of payment, trading in money market instruments, foreign exchange, and securities,
money broking, and safe custody services. See id. at 13. Financial institutions as defined
in the EC Directive on money laundering include duly authorized insurance companies.
See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 1, at 79.
22. As defined in EC Council Directive 77/780, a credit institution is "an undertak-
ing whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to
grant credits for its own account." Council Directive 77/780, art. 1, 1977 OJ. (L 322)
30, 31. Both financial and credit institutions are considered to be in a "highly effective"
position to detect and report laundering offenses. See Council Directive 91/308, supra
note 11, at 77. The Directive widely defines credit and financial institutions to prevent
money launderers from shifting their proceeds to institutions not covered under the Di-
rective. See Banking: Draft Directive Against Money Laundering on Course, Eur. Rep.,
Sept. 26, 1990, at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. In addition to
these institutions, member states are required to extend this Directive to all professions or
undertakings susceptible to money laundering practices. See Council Directive 91/308,
supra note 11, art. 12, at 81.
23. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 3, at 79.
24. See id The identification requirement will be triggered whether the 15,000 ECU
(European Currency Unit) threshold is reached in a single transaction or in a series of
apparently related transactions. See id. This 15,000 ECU threshold was a compromise
figure agreed upon after some debate within the EC. See Banking: PoliticalAgreement on
Money Laundering Proposal, Eur. Rep., Dec. 11, 1990, at 3, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Banking]. Germany had preferred a higher thresh-
old of 25,000 ECU while France had been arguing for a lower 10,000 ECU threshold.
See id For a discussion of the problem in the United States of money launderers struc-
turing transactions to avoid mandatory reporting requirements, see infra note 253.
25. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 3, at 80. With regard to identifi-
cation, credit and financial institutions dealing with other credit and financial institutions
bound by the Directive are exempted from these requirements. Other exemptions involve
mainly insurance and pension plan programs. See id These other exemptions were in-
serted at the request of the Netherlands which argued that life insurance and pension
fund schemes were unlikely to be used to launder funds and should not have to comply
with the obligations of the Directive. See EC Finance, supra note 17.
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behalf business is being transacted.26 The Directive also requires that
these institutions maintain all identification and transaction records of
their customers for a minimum of five years after the relationship with
the customer terminates.27
Credit and financial institutions are also required to examine carefully
any transaction which, by its nature, they believe is likely to involve
money laundering.2  Institutions in member states are required to in-
form the appropriate authorities of any suspected money-laundering
transaction and to provide the authorities with the information necessary
for their investigations.29 The Directive further states that credit and
financial institutions should refrain from engaging in any suspected or
known money-laundering transaction until they have informed the ap-
propriate authorities.30 These authorities may, in accordance with their
national legislation, prohibit the institution from carrying out the
transaction.31
To comply with these various requirements, credit and financial insti-
tutions must develop internal control and training prbcedures to facili-
tate the detection, investigation, and reporting of transactions involving
money laundering.32 In addition, the good faith disclosure of informa-
tion to money-laundering authorities by the directors or employees of
these institutions will not breach national laws regulating the disclosure
of banking information.33 Such good faith disclosure also will not expose
the institutions, their directors, or employees to civil or penal liability.34
26. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 3, at 80.
27. See id. art. 4, at 80. Regarding identification records, credit and financial institu-
tions must retain a copy of or references to the records. Regarding transaction records,
original documents or copies admissible in court proceedings of the member state must be
retained. These records are to be maintained for evidentiary purposes in money-launder-
ing investigations. See id.
28. See id. art. 5, at 80. The EC considered creating a threshold above which finan-
cial and credit institutions would be required to examine transactions and report only
those transactions they considered to be suspicious. See Money Laundering Directive
Drafted, supra note 7. Due to disagreement between member states over the threshold
amount, this idea was not incorporated into the Directive. See id.; Eurupdate, supra note
15, at 64-65.
29. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 6, at 80. These institutions may
notify neither their customers nor any third parties that information has been supplied to
the authorities or that an investigation into suspected money laundering is taking place.
See id. art. 8, at 81. Unless otherwise permitted by the member state, information pro-
vided to the authorities is to be used only in their money-laundering investigations. See
id. art. 6, at 80.
30. See id. art. 7, at 80.
3 1. See id. When informing authorities prior to a transaction would make subsequent
efforts to prosecute the money launderer unlikely or impossible, the institution may exe-
cute the transaction and inform the authorities immediately thereafter. See id.
32. See id. art. 11, at 81.
33. See id. art. 9, at 81.
34. See id. In drafting the Directive, some member states, such as Germany, were
concerned that the required reporting of transactions believed to be suspect by credit and
financial institutions but later proved to be legitimate would subject these institutions to
prosecution and civil suits under their national laws. See Banking, supra note 24, at 3;
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Each EC member state is required to adopt national measures neces-
sary to implement the Directive by January 1, 1993." In implementing
the Directive at the national level, member states are given wide discre-
tion in levying sanctions and penalties for money laundering violations. a6
Member states are also free to adopt stricter measures to curb money
laundering, as those contained within the Directive are the minimum
prescribed level.37
B. Council of Europe Convention
The EC Directive relies upon and complements other international ef-
forts designed to combat money laundering in Europe.3" One such effort
is the Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (the "Convention").39
Signed in Strasbourg, France in November 1990, the Convention requires
that signatory countries implement a system of international cooperation
in order to deprive criminals of their proceeds.' The Convention has
been signed by those countries which comprise the Council of Europe4 '
and will be effective upon ratification by three signatory countries, at
least two of which must be members of the Council.42
EC Proposed Directive To Make Money Laundering Criminal Makes Progress, [July-Dec.]
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 959 (Dec. 10, 1990).
35. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 16, at 81.
36. See id art. 14, at 81. The Directive itself does not harmonize among member
states the penalties and sanctions to be levied for violations thereof nor the level of coop-
eration needed for implementation. See Euroscope, supra note 16. See generally Council
Directive 91/308, supra note I 1 (absence of "harmonizing" requirements). However, the
Directive does call for the establishment of a committee, under the auspices of the EC
Commission, "to facilitate harmonized implementation of this Directive." Council Di-
rective 91/308, supra note 11, art. 13, at 81. This committee would also monitor, advise,
and report to the Commission on proposed amendments to the Directive which would
help to eliminate money laundering. See id
37. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 15, at 81.
38. See id at 77-78; EC Ministers to Adopt Formally Money Laundering Law, Reuter
Libr. Rep., Jun. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Money
Laundering Measures Approved, Fin. Reg. Rep., Mar. 1990, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File. As stated by the General Secretariat of the EC Council, the
Directive "falls within the framework of (other) international initiatives" involving
money laundering. Council of Europe, supra note 20, at 7.
39. See Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confisca-
tion of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991) [herein-
after 30 I.L.M.].
40. See id at 150.
41. Current signatories to the Convention include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Den-
mark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See id at 148; European Laundering
Convention Progresses, 7 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. 380, 380 (Oct. 1991); Money Laun-
dering: Switzerland Signs Council of Europe Convention, Eur. Rep., Sept. 4, 1991, at 3,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Twelve Council of Europe Members
Sign Pact to Crack Down on Money Laundering, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No.
20, at 838 (Nov. 19, 1990); Zagaris, Austria and Switzerland Sign European Laundering
Convention, 7 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. 293, 293 (Aug. 1991).
42. See 30 I.L.M., supra note 39, art. 36, at 162.
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Parties to the Convention are requested to enact, at the national level,
all measures necessary for the investigation and confiscation of proceeds
and property derived from criminal activity.43 Parties also are requested
to enact all measures necessary to order financial and credit institutions
to surrender records where money laundering is suspected.4  Further-
more, bank secrecy laws are to be eliminated as a grounds for refusal to
comply with these regulations.45
According to the Convention, money laundering will be made a crimi-
nal offense under the domestic law of each nation.46 In addition, parties
are called upon to cooperate with each other "to the widest extent possi-
ble" in investigating, freezing or seizing, and confiscating proceeds and
property derived from criminal activity. 47 The Convention lists the
grounds under which a party may rightfully refuse or postpone cooperat-
ing with another party.4 8 Finally, the Convention outlines the proce-
dures the parties are to use when communicating with each other in
handling and executing requests made regarding the Convention.49
C. FATF Report
Another international program relied upon by the EC in formulating
its Directive is the Group of Seven ("G7") Financial Action Task Force
("FATF") report adopted in April 1990.50 The FATF was created in
July 1989 at the Economic Summit of Industrialized Countries in Paris
in an effort to develop an international approach to controlling money
laundering.51 The FATF report consists of a forty-point proposal for
43. See id. arts. 2-3, at 151.
44. See id. art. 4, at 151.
45. See id.
46. As in the case of the EC Directive, the Council of Europe Convention uses the
definition of money laundering contained in the Vienna Convention without restricting
this definition solely to drug-related offenses. See id. art. 6, at 152; supra note 18.
47. See 30 I.L.M., supra note 39, arts. 7-17, at 153-55.
48. See id. arts. 18-20, at 155-57.
49. See id. arts. 23-35, at 158-61.
50. Regarding the EC Directive, EC Commissioner Leon Brittan stated, "Our ap-
proach is fully in accordance with the work of the G-7 Task Force on Money Launder-
ing." EC Ministers Approve Directive To Control Money Laundering of Drug, Illicit
Profits, Int'l Fin. Daily (BNA), June 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
51. See Banoun and Lerner, supra note 9, at 6; G-7, Europe Progress on Laundering
Initiatives, Money Laundering Alert, July 1991, at 7 [hereinafter G-7, Europe]. For its
definition of money laundering, the FATF report relies on the definition contained within
the Vienna Convention but restricts the scope of the definition to include only drug-
related criminal activity. See supra note 18. Since releasing its report, the FATF has
expanded to over thirty nations-going beyond the G-7 nations, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and nine other partici-
pants, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the Commission of the European Communities, to include countries
such as Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portu-
gal, and Turkey. See FA TF Members Agree to Mutual Assessment of Progress in Fighting
Money Laundering, [Jan.-June] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1164 (June 17, 1991)
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reducing international money laundering grouped broadly into three cat-
egories: criminal law, banking law, and international cooperation. 2
In its report, the FATF recommends that nations enact legislation
making money laundering a criminal offense and holding corporations
and their employees criminally liable for money-laundering activities.53
The FATF also proposes that financial institutions improve their systems
for monitoring cash transactions' and report all suspected drug-related
transactions.55 To allow financial institutions to report suspect transac-
tions in good faith without risking civil or criminal liability, the report
urges the relaxing of national bank secrecy laws.5 6
Pursuant to the FATF report, financial institutions are requested to
improve their methods of identifying customers and to ascertain the ac-
tual beneficiaries, if different from the account holders, of all accounts.5 7
The FATF notes that anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious
names should be prohibited.-" In addition, all transaction and identifica-
tion records should be maintained for a minimum of five years, as poten-
tial evidence in prosecuting money-laundering activity.59 Financial
institutions should also institute internal training and control procedures
to detect and report money-laundering transactions.'
The report also endorses wider ratification of the Vienna Convention
which commits signatory nations to criminalizing money laundering and
opens channels for mutual legal assistance. 61 Cooperation between coun-
tries in the areas of confiscation and extradition is promoted by the
FATE.62 FATF members believe that law enforcement authorities, fi-
nancial institution regulators, and financial institutions must all collabo-
[hereinafter FATF Members]. France held the presidency of the FATF during its first
two years and passed this title to Switzerland in mid-1991. See G-7, Europe, supra, at 7.
Australia is due to assume the presidency in mid-1992. See id.
52. See Graham, Limits on Bank Secrecy Proposed to Curb Laundering, Fin. Tunes,
Apr. 12, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
53. See Banoun and Lerner, supra note 9, at 6.
54. See Lascelles, supra note 4, at 39.
55. See id. FATF members were unable to agree on whether such reporting should
be mandatory or permissive. See Treasury Releases G-7 Report Calling for Cooperation
Against Money Laundering, [Jan.-June] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 703 (Apr. 23,
1990) [hereinafter Treasury Releases]. The FATF report suggests that countries consider
requiring financial institutions to report all currency transactions greater than a pre-
scribed amount. See id. at 703. However, a majority of FATF members opposed a sys-
tem that required nations to report all large domestic and foreign funds transfers to
national computerized agencies that would be accessible to law enforcement authorities.
See id. at 704.
56. See Treasury Releases, supra note 55, at 703.
57. See Graham, supra note 52, at 1.
58. See G-7 Nations Launch Global Laundering Assault, Money Laundering Alert,
May, 1990, at 1.
59. See Treasury Releases, supra note 55, at 704.
60. See Banoun & Lerner, supra note 9, at 6.
61. See Lascelles, infra note 4, at 39; infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
62. See Banoun & Lerner, supra note 9, at 6.
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rate with one another to end money laundering. 63 To facilitate this
cooperation, existing international organizations should be used to moni-
tor money transfers between countries and provide information on ways
to improve money laundering detection."
In a continuing effort to fight international money laundering, the sec-
ond session of the FATF issued a prepared statement on June 4, 1991 at
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") meeting in Paris.65 The statement noted that the nations, ter-
ritories, and organizations which comprise the FATF had agreed to a
process of "mutual assessment" in order to ensure that the proposals
contained in the April 1990 FATF report were being implemented.66
Pursuant to this statement, each member of the FATF will be evaluated
three years after endorsing the April 1990 report, and summaries of these
evaluations will be made public. 67 The FATF also agreed to attempt to
increase its membership and to influence non-member countries to sup-
port the proposals listed in the April 1990 report. 6
D. Basle Committee Statement
International money laundering was also the focus of a statement is-
sued in Basle, Switzerland by the Committee on Banking Regulations
Supervisory Practices ("Basle Committee") in December 1988.69 This
Committee7 ° consisted of representatives from the central banks and su-
pervisory authorities of the Group of Ten ("G10").? In its statement,
the Basle Committee recognized that, although the main purpose of bank
supervisory authorities is to maintain the financial stability of banks, and
not to ensure the legitimacy of individual banking transactions, these au-
63. See Treasury Releases, supra note 55, at 703.
64. See G-7 Nations Launch Global Laundering Assault, supra note 58, at 1.
65. See FATFMembers, supra note 51, at 1164.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. To become a member of the FATF, a nation is required to endorse the
proposals contained within the April 1990 report. See G-7, Europe, supra note 51, at 7.
By expanding its membership and trying to influence non-member countries, the FATF
had hoped to make it more difficult for criminals to launder their funds between nations.
See FATF Members, supra note 51, at 1164. More recently, however, the FATF has
stated that, in order to maintain its efficiency, membership should not be extended be-
yond those already invited to join. See Zagaris, Financial Action Task Force Report Pro-
vides Additional Momentum, 7 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. 421, 424 (Nov. 1991). For
further details of the most recent report issued by the FATF, see id.
69. For the text of the Basle Committee Statement, see Trends and Forces in Interna-
tional Banking Law 113-17 (W. Park ed., Boston Univ., Mar. 1990) [hereinafter Trends
and Forces].
70. The Basle Committee had been formerly known as the Cooke Committee. See
Murphy, Central Bankers Join Fight Against Money-Laundering, Reuter Bus. Rep., Jan.
6, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
71. The Committee was comprised of representatives from Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United
States, as well as Luxembourg and Sweden. See Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 114
n.2.
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thorities "cannot be indifferent to the use made of banks by criminals."'
Such indifference may cause banks to suffer losses through fraud or the
adverse effects of being associated with criminals.7 This association of
banks with criminal activity erodes public confidence and undermines
the stability of the banking system. 4
To maintain the stability of financial institutions and prevent criminal
use of the banking system internationally, the Basle Committee devel-
oped a set of principles in the belief that "the first and most important
safeguard against money-laundering is the integrity of banks' own man-
agements and their vigilant determination to prevent their institutions
becoming associated with criminals or being used as a channel for
money-laundering."75 The Committee agreed that banks should make
reasonable efforts to identify customers and ascertain actual ownership of
accounts and safety deposit facilities.76 The Committee also agreed that
banks should not engage in transactions with customers who fail to pro-
vide evidence of their identity' nor in transactions which the banks
"have good reason to suppose are associated with money-laundering
activities."78
The Basle Committee stated that banks should cooperate to the extent
possible with national law enforcement authorities without violating reg-
ulations on customer confidentiality.79 Banks should not assist custom-
ers who attempt to deceive law enforcement authorities.' When banks
have reason to presume that a deposit derives from criminal activity, or
that a transaction is criminal in nature, they should take appropriate
legal measures."1 Banks are requested to adopt formal policies consistent
with these principles and to develop internal control and training proce-
dures to ensure that these policies are executed.82 Furthermore, banks
should develop specific procedures for customer identification and for the
retention of transaction records.83
E. Vienna Convention
The primary international effort to halt the laundering of drug pro-
ceeds upon which the EC Directive and other efforts rely is the Vienna
72. Id at 114.
73. See id
74. See id.
75. Id at 115.
76. See id at 116.
77. See id
78. Id at 117. Bank management should ensure that all business conforms with high
ethical standards and comports with related laws and regulations. See id at 116-17.
79. See id at 117.
80. See id
81. These measures include denying assistance, severing customer relations, or clos-
ing or freezing the customer's account. See id
82. See id
83. See id
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Convention. 4 The Convention was enacted formally in November 1990
after being ratified by the requisite twenty nations.85 In recognition of
escalating international drug production and trafficking, an important
aim of the Convention is "to deprive persons engaged in illicit [drug]
traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate
their main incentive for so doing."86 The Convention focuses upon inter-
national cooperation as an important means of eliminating drug money
laundering. 7
Each party to the Convention is required to adopt national measures
necessary to criminalize the laundering of proceeds derived from drug
trafficking and production. 8 Similarly, each party is obligated to adopt
national measures necessary to empower domestic authorities to confis-
cate drug proceeds and property purchased with drug proceeds.89 If con-
fiscation of proceeds and property is requested by another party with
jurisdiction over the offense, the party receiving the request is obligated
to identify, trace, and freeze or seize the requested items.' Parties are to
consider contributing confiscated proceeds or property to intergovern-
mental drug-fighting agencies or equitably dividing these proceeds or
property among the involved parties. 91
Each party also is required to enunciate those criminal offenses that
are deemed extraditable pursuant to the Convention and must include
these offenses in extradition treaties between the parties.92 Parties shall
provide one another with "the widest measure of mutual legal assistance
in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings" for criminal of-
fenses covered by the Convention. 93 Mutual legal assistance may not be
denied on the grounds of bank secrecy laws.94 Furthermore, parties are
84. See Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter 28 LL.M.]. "The Convention sup-
plements and reinforces several earlier U.N. measures contained in the Single Convention
on Narcotics Drugs, 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol [reprinted in I 1 I.L.M. 804
(1972)] and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances [reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 261
(1971)]." Id. at 493. Signatories to the Vienna Convention include Cyprus, Denmark,
Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United
States. See id. For the definition of money laundering included in the Vienna Conven-
tion, applicable exclusively to drug-related criminal activity, see supra note 18.
85. See UN Drugs, Laundering Convention Now World Law, Money Laundering
Alert, Nov. 1990, at 7. These ratifying nations are required to implement legislation and
administrative measures to monitor and enforce the provisions of the Convention. See
U.K., 16 Other Nations Ratify UN Convention, Money Laundering Alert, Oct. 1991, at 7.
86. 28 I.L.M., supra note 84, at 498.
87. See id.
88. See id. art. 3, at 500-03.
89. See id. art. 5, at 504-07.
90. See id. at 505.
91. See id. at 506.
92. See id. art. 6, at 507. Each party shall also take all appropriate measures to expe-
dite extradition requests by another party to the Convention. See id. at 507-08.
93. Id. art. 7, at 508. This assistance may include providing relevant information or
records, or executing drug-related searches and seizures. See id.
94. See id. at 509.
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expected to cooperate with one another by maintaining lines of commu-
nication through which information may be passed and inquiries con-
ducted.9" Finally, parties must develop law enforcement training
programs to detect, monitor, and prevent criminal offenses covered by
the Convention.96
II. RECENT EUROPEAN NATIONAL EFFORTS To CONTROL MONEY
LAUNDERING
In support of the recent international efforts to curb money laundering
in Europe, many European nations have adopted, or are in the process of
adopting, measures aimed at thwarting money laundering. These meas-
ures consist of legislation and regulations designed to prevent laundering
within national borders and to foster cooperation between nations in
achieving this goal.
A. Switzerland
Although not part of the EC, Switzerland has taken the lead in com-
batting money laundering. Swiss financial institutions were notorious
havens for criminals and dictators to safely conceal the source of their
funds by hiding behind Swiss bank secrecy laws.9" Swiss banks have
been implicated frequently in international money-laundering opera-
tions.9 8 In an effort to break from its nefarious past, the Swiss govern-
ment, in conjunction with Swiss financial institutions, has recently
enacted a multitude of anti-money-laundering legislation. 9
95. See id arL 9, at 511-12.
96. See id at 512.
97. See Peters, Money Laundering and Its Current Status in Switzerland: New Disin-
centivesfor Financial Tourism, 11 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 104, 105 (1990); Mufson, Swiss
to End Anonymous Bank Accounts, Wash. Post, May 4, 1991, at A20, col. 3; Murphy,
supra note 70.
98. See Wicks, Swiss Bank Code Agreed on Depositor Verification, Fin. Times, Mar.
24, 1987, at 33, col. 4. Two recent money-laundering scandals involving Swiss financial
institutions were the "Lebanon Connection" and the "Pizza Connection." See Peters,
supra note 97, at 106. The "Lebanon Connection," uncovered in autumn of 1988, in-
volved allegations that several of Switzerland's largest banks had aided in the laundering
of approximately $1 billion for a Lebanese-Turkish drug ring over a two-year period. See
id at 106 n.8. The "Pizza Connection," uncovered in spring of 1984, involved allegations
that a number of Swiss banks and finance companies had aided in laundering the profits
derived from the sale of heroin valued at $1.6 billion. See id at 106 n.7.
99. In acting to prevent money laundering, Switzerland was motivated to reform by
strong pressure from the United States and by internal scandals. See Bates, Swiss Phasing
Out Secret Bank Accounts, L.A. Times, May 4, 1991, at DI, col. 2; Council of Europe,
supra note 20, at 7; Mufson, supra note 97, at A20, col. 3; Parry, Swiss Laws to Get
Tougher on Laundering of Money, Wash. Post, May 11, 1989, at D4, col. 1. Subsequent
investigation of the "Lebanon Connection," see discussion supra note 98, led to the resig-
nation of the Swiss Justice Minister when it was publicly disclosed that the Minister had
notified her husband of an ongoing money-laundering investigation that might implicate
him. See Council of Europe, supra note 20, at 7. As a result of this particular scandal, a
Swiss parliamentary commission was formed in January 1989 to investigate the Federal
Justice and Police Department and reported that Swiss justice officials were too soft on
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In March 1990, the Swiss Parliament gave final approval to Articles
305bis and 305ter of the Swiss Penal Code which criminalize money
laundering." °° Article 305bis, entitled "Money Laundering," punishes
by imprisonment or fine any act which attempts to obstruct investigation
into the origin, discovery, or confiscation of assets or property which the
actor knows or assumes originated from a crime.101 Article 305bis is not
limited to drug-related assets or property and encompasses the proceeds
derived from any criminal activity under Swiss law.102 The Swiss ex-
tended jurisdiction under the Article to principal crimes that are commit-
ted and punishable in a foreign country.10 3 The heightened sanctions of
Article 305bis include a five-year maximum prison sentence and a fine of
up to one million Swiss francs in aggravated cases. t"
Facing opposition from banks, the Swiss government abandoned the
idea of criminalizing the negligent acceptance of criminal funds.'05 Arti-
cle 305ter, entitled "Lack of Due Diligence in Handling Money," how-
organized crime. See Shields, Swiss Officials Too Soft on Organised Crime, Panel Charges,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Nov. 24, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
Political uproar over the scandal and its aftermath provided a strong impetus for the
Swiss legislature to move quickly in enacting legislation criminalizing money laundering.
See Peters, supra note 97, at 106-07.
100. See Peters, supra note 97, at 107 n. 13. Articles 305bis and 305ter became effective
on August 1, 1990. See Zeldin, New Swiss Law Makes Money Laundering a Crime,
Money Laundering Alert, Nov. 1990, at 6. Practical enforcement of Articles 305bis and
305ter poses some problems, however. See Peters, supra note 97, at 136-37. Many Swiss
financial institutions and persons acting on behalf of third parties are not subject to the
supervision of an outside agency or auditor who can report violations of the new laws to
law enforcement authorities. See id. at 137. Learning of violations of the new laws is
hindered further by the absence of any requirement under current Swiss law to report
suspicious transactions or all transactions over a specified amount. See id. Even with a
reporting requirement, however, Swiss law enforcement agencies may lack the resources
needed to handle the added burden. See id.
101. See Art. 305bis, StGB (Swiss Penal Code) [hereinafter "305bis"]. Knowledge
under 305bis may be proven directly, by actual or constructive knowledge, or indirectly,
by reckless disregard or willful blindness. See Zeldin, supra note 100, at 6; see also Peters,
supra note 97, at 135 (noting the difficulty in proving knowledge or assumption of defend-
ant that assets were derived from crime). Under 305bis, the Swiss public prosecutor must
prove the illegal origin of the assets or property in question. See Zeldin, supra note 100,
at 6.
102. See 305bis, supra note 101. Prior to the enactment of 305bis, money laundering
was only a criminal act if the proceeds were then recycled into drug trafficking. See New,
Proposed Swiss Laws Seen Toughest Yet Against Money-Laundering, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
May 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
103. See Zeldin, supra note 100, at 6.
104. See 305bis, supra note 101. Aggravated cases are those cases where the violator is
a member of organized crime, a member of a gang created for the purpose of continual
money laundering, or a professional who makes a large profit through laundering activi-
ties. See id.
105. See New, supra note 102. As stated by a spokesperson for the Union Bank of
Switzerland, the largest Swiss bank, "If banks are lied to by very professional criminals
with excellent false papers then often there is little they can do .... We have always said
that it is too much to ask of banks that they make sure they are not holding any illegal
money." Id.; see also Time to Pay the Laundry Bill, Bus. L. Br., May 1989, at 7 (banks
oppose being placed in the position of policemen).
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ever, punishes by imprisonment, arrest, or fine one who professionally
accepts, deposits, or assists in investing or transferring foreign assets and
fails to determine, with the care required by the circumstances, the iden-
tity of the beneficial owner. 6 Article 305ter binds financial institutions
conducting transactions on behalf of third parties0" and will attach
whether the assets originate from legitimate or illegitimate activity.10 8
In addition to criminalizing money laundering, the Swiss Government
is considering partial reform of its federal bank secrecy laws which date
back to 19 34 ."°9 In March 1991, the Swiss Justice Ministry proposed
legislation that would enable anyone reporting suspicious financial trans-
actions to avoid being charged with violating bank secrecy laws. "0 The
proposed legislation was drafted by an interdepartmental government
task force 1 and would eradicate the conflict plaguing financial institu-
tions.1 12 This conflict occurs when institutions violate money-laundering
statutes by failing to report illegitimate suspicious transactions, but vio-
late bank secrecy laws by reporting suspicious transactions that later
prove to be legitimate.' 13 The proposed legislation also grants greater
powers for magistrates to seize allegedly laundered assets.' '4
Switzerland has been increasingly willing to cooperate in international
investigations by providing requested financial information."' As a re-
106. See Art. 305ter, StGB (Swiss Penal Code); Zeldin, supra note 100, at 6.
107. See Zeldin, supra note 100, at 6.
108. See id.
109. See New, supra note 102. Under federal bank secrecy laws, persons who inten-
tionally or negligently disclose customers' banking secrets in the absence of client consent
or other limited circumstances shall be punished by a prison term and/or fine. See Pe-
ters, supra note 97, at 110 n.27 (referring to Federal Act Concerning Banks and Savings
Banks, Art. 47, §§ I, 11 (1934)); Haar, Money Laundering in the EC, Money Laundering
L. Rep., Mar. 1991, at 1, 4. Banks that illegally disclose customer information face civil
suits as well as potential loss of their license to operate. See Haar, supra, at 4.
110. See New, supra note 102.
111. See Swiss Weigh Tough Steps Against Money Laundering, Reuters, Apr. 25, 1990,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Swiss Weigh].
112. See New, supra note 102.
113. See id
114. See Fewer Secrets at Swiss Banks, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1991, at AI0, col. 3. The
Swiss Government may also require border declarations from international travellers car-
rying more than 100,000 Swiss francs. See Kochinke, The Swiss Working Group Recom-
mendations on Moneylaundering, 6 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. 188, 188 (May 1990); Swiss
Weigh, supra note 111. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 5, at 241-43 (outlawing duty of individual
under United States law (31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1990)) to file a report (CMIR) with
customs any time the individual enters or exits the United States with more than Sl0,000
in currency or other monetary instruments). For those individuals who fail to report
funds as required, the Swiss government is considering empowering customs officials to
freeze these funds at the border for three days while the source of the funds is determined.
See Kochinke, supra. Swiss customs officials estimate that more than 135 million Swiss
francs in cash enter the country each week. See Swiss Weigh, supra note 111.
115. See Mufson, supra note 97; Swiss Showing Readiness to Freeze Dictators' Assets,
Wash. Post, Jan. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 1. For its cooperation with United States law en-
forcement agencies, Switzerland received $I million from the United States government
as its share of a penalty imposed on a foreign bank for money-laundering violations. See
Narcotics-Related Money Laundering and Other Financial Transactions, Int'l Narc. Con-
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suit of Articles 305bis and 305ter, foreign law enforcement authorities
who investigate international laundering operations and seek information
from Swiss banks will have greater success in obtaining this information
through judicial intervention. 16 In addition to providing foreign nations
with requested information, Switzerland has demonstrated its willingness
to cooperate with foreign nations in other arenas. The Swiss participated
in drafting the FATF report and the Basle Committee statement 17 and
signed the Council of Europe Convention on money laundering in Au-
gust 1991.1
Swiss banks have also exhibited initiative in combatting money laun-
dering. 119 One significant effort is an agreement between the Swiss Bank-
ers' Association and the signatory Swiss banks to identify actual owners
of deposits. 20 This agreement ("CDB") obligates signatory banks "to
verify the identity of their contracting partners and, in cases of doubt, to
obtain from the contracting partner a declaration setting forth the iden-
tity of the beneficial owner." 21 In establishing business relations, if the
trol Strategy Rep., Mar. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File, at
*13 [hereinafter Narcotics-Related Money].
116. Under Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, Swiss officials may grant the requests
of countries seeking judicial assistance only with respect to those acts which are criminal
under the requesting country's law as well as Swiss law. See Peters, supra note 97, at 137-
38. Swiss federal law prohibits the disclosure of banking information to foreign officials if
it is in Switzerland's interest as a political or economic entity to keep this information
secret or if third parties, who have a protected interest in keeping the information secret,
have not authorized disclosure. See Haar, supra note 109, at 4.
117. See supra notes 51, 71.
118. See supra note 41.
119. In theory, Article 3 of the Swiss Banking Law should have reduced incidences of
money laundering through Swiss financial institutions by requiring these institutions, in
order to obtain a license, to be carefully directed and supervised by persons who possess a
good reputation and guarantee "irreproachable management." See Swiss Banking Law,
art. 3, §§ 1-2, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 87-88. "Irreproachable
management" has been interpreted by the Federal Banking Commission to encompass
personal integrity, sufficient organization and documentation, knowledge of clients, and
inquiry into client's economic background for important, complicated, or unusual trans-
actions. See id. at 85; see also Peters, supra note 97, at 125-27 (listing reasons why Article
3 of the Swiss Banking Law, in practice, is unsuited for reducing money laundering).
120. See Agreement on the Swiss Banks' Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise
of Due Diligence (CDB) of July 1, 1987, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at
95-108 [hereinafter CDB]. The current CDB became effective in October 1987 and will
expire in September 1992. See id. at 23, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at
106. The CDB had originally been adopted in 1977 after a major scandal involving
fraudulent practices at Credit Suisse was uncovered. See Wicks, supra note 98, at 33, col.
4. The CDB was amended and renewed in 1982 between the Swiss National Bank and
the Swiss Bankers' Association. See id. The CDB, as amended and renewed again in
1987, was developed after consulting the Swiss Federal Banking Commission ("EBK")
and organizations representing lawyers and trustees, but was not renewed by the Swiss
National Bank. See id. The 1987 version of the CDB includes the central guidelines of
the 1982 version. See id.
121. CDB, supra note 120, art. 1, at 3, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69,
at 96. Pursuant to the CDB, banks will verify the identity of a contracting partner upon
establishing business relations with the bank. See id. art. 2, at 5-8, reprinted in Trends
and Forces, supra note 69, at 97-99. For purposes of verifying identification, the estab-
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bank has any doubt that the contracting partner may not be the benefi-
cial owner, then the bank agrees to exercise due diligence in obtaining a
written statement, known as a "Form A.""t  The Form A contains a
certification by the contracting partner that the partner is the beneficial
owner or, if not, discloses the identity of the beneficial owner."~ If a
bank has "serious doubts" about the accuracy of this information that
can not be resolved through further inquiry, the bank agrees to terminate
its relationship with the customer. 24
Pursuant to the CDB, persons prohibited from identifying beneficial
owners due to rules regarding professional confidentiality were required
to provide the banks with a different type of written statement, known as
a "Form B."125 Third-party representatives of beneficial owners were
lishment of business relations includes the opening of accounts, passbooks, or securities
accounts, the entering into of fiduciary transactions, the renting of safe-deposit boxes, and
the executing of cash transactions involving amounts greater than 100,000 Swiss francs.
See id at 5, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 97. See also New, supra
note 102 (Swiss government and bank officials are discussing laws requiring banks to
identify clients involved in transactions over 50,000 Swiss francs). For personal negotia-
tions between a bank and a contracting partner, written identification documents re-
quired from the partner by the bank will usually take the form of a passport, driver's
license, or identity card. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 2, at 6, reprinted in Trends and
Forces, supra note 69, at 98. Since banks are not required by the CDB to terminate
banking relations or conduct further investigations into identity once they have been
presented with written identification, Swiss officials have noted that it is possible to pre-
serve anonymity under the CDB through the use of forged identification documents. See
Peters, supra note 97, at 113-14. The requirement under the CDB that banks identify the
beneficial parties in all banking transactions has been codified by Article 305ter which
imposes criminal sanctions for failing to comply. See supra note 106 and accompanying
text. Compliance with the CDB by signatory banks is supervised by banks' internal audi-
tors and by independent certified accountants. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 10, at 20,
reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 105; Peters, supra note 97, at 120-21.
Potential violations of the CDB are to be reported to the Federal Banking Commission
and an Oversight Board created by the CDB which has the power to investigate and
impose sanctions of up to ten million Swiss francs. See CDB, supra note 120, arts. I1 &
12, at 20-22, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 105-06; Peters, supra note
97, at 120-21. Banks which refuse to assist the Oversight Board in its investigation are
also subject to fine. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 11, at 21, reprinted in Trends and
Forces, supra note 69, at 105.
122. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 3, at 8-9, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note
69, at 99.
123. See id at 8, Annex, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 99, 107.
124. See id at 9 reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 99. Banks' successes
in using Form As to ascertain the identity of beneficial owners has been questioned. Pe-
ters, supra note 97, at 116. The CDB does not provide guidelines as to what circum-
stances create "serious doubts" justifying further inquiry into or termination of the
relationship with the customer. See id. Persons filling out Form As are not required to
supply written documentation verifying the identity of the stated beneficial owner. See id4
In reality, banks usually do not even make attempts to verify the accuracy of a customer's
Form A that names a third party as beneficial owner. See id.
125. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 5, at 11-14, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra
note 69, at 100-02. In the absence of client consent or other limited circumstances, those
persons who violate their oaths of professional confidentiality by revealing financial infor-
mation regarding a client are subject to criminal sanctions of up to three years in prison
and/or 40,000 Swiss francs in fines. See Peters, supra note 97, at 109 n.25. Form B is not
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required to certify that they knew the beneficial owners and that, having
exercised due diligence, they were not aware of any fact indicating that
the owners were abusing bank secrecy laws or concealing criminally de-
rived proceeds. 126 These Form B accounts preserved anonymity by per-
mitting bank clients to conduct their transactions through an attorney,
notary, trustee, fiduciary, or asset administrator but were employed fre-
quently to launder criminal proceeds. 127 To counteract this laundering
of funds, Form B accounts were restricted to cases where a professional's
relationship to a client was not merely provisional and extended beyond
the opening of an account. 12s The professional agreed to supervise the
transactions made in the account and to report to the bank any change in
status or condition certified in the Form B. 129 Despite these restrictions,
however, the number of anonymous Form B accounts remained suspi-
ciously high.' 3 '
To prevent money launderers from continuing to abuse this Form B
loophole, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission ("EBK") issued a
communique in May 1991 abolishing most anonymous bank accounts in
Swiss banks.' The EBK requires a written statement regarding the
identity of the actual owners of existing Form B accounts by September
1992.132 In addition, new account holders must have been identified and
registered with the EBK as of July 1991.133 The EBK also established a
task force to provide banks with clear guidelines for identifying clients. 13 4
To further reduce money laundering, the EBK developed a licensing
system for bank note trading.'35 Switzerland exchanges approximately
required for accounts, securities accounts, and fiduciary transactions of Swiss and foreign
banks. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 5, at 12, 13, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra
note 69, at 101.
126. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 5, at 12, Annex, reprinted in Trends and Forces,
supra note 69, at 101, 107-08; Bates, supra note 99, at Dl, col. 2.
127. See New, supra note 102.
128. These restrictions are found in Form B accounts as amended in 1987 and later
revised in early 1989. See CDB, supra note 120, art. 5, at 12, Annex, reprinted in Trends
and Forces, supra note 69, at 101, 107-08; Peters, supra note 97, at 117-18; Swiss Bank
Watchdogs Seek to Plug Secrecy Loophole, Reuters, Apr. 10, 1990, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Swiss Bank].
129. See CDB, supra note 120, at Annex, reprinted in Trends and Forces, supra note
69, at 107-08.
130. See Swiss Bank, supra note 128.
131. See New, supra note 102; Mufson, supra note 97, at A20, col. 3.
132. See New, supra note 102; Mufson, supra note 97, at A20, col. 3.
133. See Mufson, supra note 97, at A20, col. 3. An exception to this identification
requirement was created for deposits made in connection with ongoing legal proceedings,
such as divorces or inheritances. See Bates, supra note 99, at D1, col. 2.
134. See New, supra note 102. These guidelines require banks to make further inquir-
ies in cases where a new customer opens an account by depositing an amount greater than
100,000 Swiss francs, a prior customer frequently engages in transactions that are not
compatible with the customer's legitimate business, or a previously inactive account sud-
denly and suspiciously becomes active. See Swiss Banking Commission Issues Guidelines
to Deter Money Laundering, AFP-Extel News, Feb. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
135. See Time to Pay the Laundry Bill, supra note 105. Only the three largest Swiss
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100 billion Swiss francs annually (eight percent of the world total) in
foreign cash. 36 To obtain a license under the new system, banks must
prove that they have developed adequate safeguards to prevent the laun-
dering of funds. 13 7 The executive boards of these banks will be held re-
sponsible in the event of a violation, and bank auditors must supervise
note trading more carefully.1 38 Regulations also require banks to investi-
gate the character of trading partners and sever relations with customers
suspected of criminal activity. 1
39
B. Great Britain
Like Switzerland, Great Britain's financial community had been used
previously to launder illegal proceeds and has recently enacted measures
to rectify this problem."4  The 1986 Drug Trafficking Offences Act
makes the laundering of drug-related funds a crime.' 4' The 1986 Act
imposes criminal sanctions on those who act or facilitate'42 others, whom
they know or suspect of drug trafficking, to retain, control, or invest the
proceeds from their drug-related activities.' 43 The 1986 Act also imposes
criminal sanctions on those persons, including financial institutions, who
fail to inform law enforcement officials of any suspicion or belief that the
funds or investments of another may be linked to drug trafficking.'" Sig-
banks, Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corp and Credit Suisse, are active traders
of banknotes. See Swiss Bank, supra note 128.
136. See Time to Pay the Laundry Bill, supra note 105, at 7.
137. See id at 8.
138. See id,
139. See Swiss Bank, supra note 128.
140. The National Drugs Intelligence Unit ("NDIU") in Great Britain has estimated
that annual drug profits total roughly one billion British pounds which is available to be
laundered through the country's financial institutions. See Nowinski & Bagge, supra note
9, at 29. Concern by bank regulators who fear the de-stabilizing of financial institutions
and by law enforcement agencies who are fighting drug trafficking has enabled Great
Britain to act quickly in passing legislation that will hinder money laundering. See id.;
Elliott, From the Drug Barons to City Banks. Dirty Money Comes Clean, Sunday Tele-
graph, Jan. 14, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
141. See Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24.
142. One can facilitate by concealment, by removal from the jurisdiction, by transfer to
nominees, or otherwise. See ia at § 24(l)(a).
143. See id at § 24(1). Under the 1986 Act, it is a defense if the accused can prove
that he did not know or suspect that the proceeds were related to drug-trafficking or that
the retention or control of drug-trafficking proceeds by another was being facilitated. See
iad at § 24(4). In 1989, criminal sanctions that attach for facilitating another to retain or
control funds were extended to instances where the funds relate to terrorist activity. See
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4, § 11.
144. See Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24(1). Under the 1986 Act, it
is a defense if the accused can prove that he intended to disclose his suspicion or belief to
law enforcement officials but there was a reasonable excuse for his failure to do so. See id
at § 24(4). As of 1989, persons are also required to disclose their suspicions or beliefs
regarding terrorist funds to law enforcement officials. See Prevention of Terrorism (Tem-
porary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4, § 11. In regard to serious criminal offenses other
than drug trafficking or terrorism, persons, including financial institutions, have the right,
but not the duty, to report their suspicions to law enforcement authorities. See Levi,
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nificantly, those who report transactions known or suspected to involve
laundered proceeds related to drug trafficking are insulated from any lia-
bility for breach of confidentiality.145
Under the 1986 Act, law enforcement authorities have been able to
obtain complete access to a suspected drug trafficker's bank account. 46
Convicted drug traffickers are then subject to confiscation orders by Brit-
ish courts.' 47 British courts have the authority to confiscate the proceeds
that they believe are derived from a drug trafficker's entire illegal ca-
reer.14s In issuing the confiscation order, the courts may act on the re-
buttable presumption that all of the trafficker's assets held during the
past six years are derived from drug-related activity.14 9
Sanctions under the 1986 Act were endorsed by the 1990 Criminal
Justice (International Co-operation) Act.' 50 The 1990 Act attaches crim-
inal liability for removing or assisting in removing from the jurisdiction
property representing the proceeds of drug trafficking when the property
is known or suspected to have been derived from drug trafficking. 51 The
1990 Act also empowers British customs officers and law enforcement
authorities to seize cash they suspect is obtained through drug traffick-
ing. 152 The 1990 Act also permits closer cooperation between the United
Regulating Money Laundering, 31 Brit. J. of Criminology 109, 113 (1991); Money Laun-
dering Measures Approved, supra note 38.
145. See Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24(3)(a). The absence of liabil-
ity for good-faith disclosures is often referred to as the "safe harbor" policy. Despite the
"safe harbor" policy, some financial institutions have turned to private investigatory
agencies before disclosing suspect transactions to law enforcement authorities. See Boom
Time for Investigators; Laws Open Up Banking Market, Thomson's Fin. Compliance
Watch, May 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. In cases
where financial institutions' suspicions fall below what they believe is required to report
to law enforcement authorities, some of these institutions have relied first on discreet
background checks conducted by private agencies. In this manner, financial institutions
have complied with their investigatory duties and still maintained the confidentiality of
their clients. If the private agency reports that the transaction appears to be related to
money laundering, then the financial institution must notify law enforcement authorities.
See id.
146. See Elliott, supra note 140, at 10.
147. See Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 121; Secrecy Issues Slow Approval of
GlobalAccords, Money Laundering Alert, Dec. 1989, at 7 [hereinafter Secrecy Issues]. In
1989, 29 confiscation orders for assets valued at almost six million British pounds were
issued by British courts. See Elliott, supra note 140, at 10. One problem for law enforce-
ment authorities in obtaining a confiscation order is that the court may only include those
assets identified by authorities before the trial commences. Assets discovered after the
commencement of trial may not be added to the confiscation order. See id.
148. See Secrecy Issues, supra note 147, at 7.
149. See id. British law enforcement officials often have difficulty in identifying assets
before a trial so that they may be included in the confiscation order. See Elliott, supra
note 140, at 10.
150. See Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act, 1990, ch. 5.
151. See id. at § 14(l),(2).
152. See id. at § 25(1); Authers, Measures on Drug Money Laundering Are Ruled Out,
Fin. Times, Jul. 26, 1990, at 10, col. 2; Britain Says More Must Be Done on Money Laun-
dering, Reuters, June 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
[hereinafter Britain Says More]. The law, which applies to sums of 10,000 British pounds
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Kingdom and other countries in money-laundering cases by allowing
British law enforcement authorities to investigate, conduct searches,
serve process, and temporarily transfer prisoners to foreign jurisdictions
at the request of foreign authorities.
153
Pursuant to a 1990 government decision, British customs and law en-
forcement officials are not permitted to participate in "sting" opera-
tions154 to apprehend drug traffickers and money launderers. 155 In one
important case, however, these officials did assist in a United States
"sting" operation to track and apprehend drug traffickers and money
launderers."5 6 British customs and law enforcement officials have coop-
erated with countries other than the United States in similar pursuits.
1 57
The British government has also entered into bilateral agreements with a
number of other countries in order to provide mutual assistance in inves-
tigating and prosecuting drug-trafficking and money-laundering
offenses. 
15 8
or more, permits law enforcement officials to hold the cash for up to two years, subject to
periodic authorization by the courts. See Colley, New Law Gives Customs Power to Seize
Cash, Press Ass'n Newsfile, Sep. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File. This seized property is subject to forfeiture if later proven in a court
proceeding to represent the proceeds of drug trafficking. See Criminal Justice (Interna-
tional Co-operation) Act, 1990, ch. 5, § 26(1); supra note 147 and accompanying text.
153. See Banoun & Lerner, The International Scene, Money Laundering L. Rep., July
1991, at 1, 4 [hereinafter International Scene]. See generally Criminal Justice (Interna-
tional Co-operation) Act, 1990, ch. 5 (detailing powers given to British authorities to act
upon request of foreign officials).
154. A "sting" operation is defined as "[a]n undercover police operation in which po-
lice pose as criminals to trap law violators." Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (6th ed. 1990).
155. The British government stated, "[P]olice and customs officers should not in any
circumstances counsel, incite or procure the commission of a crime." See Authers, supra
note 152, at 10, col. 2.
156. One large international effort involved British and French customs and law en-
forcement authorities providing assistance to United States Customs officials in an inves-
tigation dubbed "Operation C-Chase." See Riddell, Money-Laundering Cash for UK,
Fin. Times, Nov. 9, 1990, at 5, col. 5; Bailey, A Case for the City to Close, Daily Tele-
graph, Jan. 30, 1991, at 17, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. "Opera-
tion C-Chase" involved customs officials posing as money launderers and managing to
infiltrate several Columbian drug rings. See Riddell, supra. As a result of this investiga-
tion, a number of officials of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)
were convicted in United States courts of money laundering and forfeited more than S15
million in BCCI funds. These seized assets were shared among the countries participat-
ing in the investigation, with Great Britain receiving three million dollars for its efforts.
See id
157. One effort, dubbed "Operation Diplomat," involved Great Britain cooperating
with customs and law enforcement officials in the Soviet Union to track and confiscate
more than eight million dollars of hashish. See England, Soviet Union Join to Block Drug
Trafficking, Money Laundering Ring, Money Laundering Alert, Jan. 1990, at 7.
158. Great Britain has bilateral agreements with a number of other nations, allowing
for the mutual exchange of information and the lifting of bank secrecy obligations where
a criminal link is suspected or proven. See Graham, supra note 52, at 1, col. 3. These
countries include the United States, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, and Canada. See Elli-
ott, supra note 140, at 10. Since money-laundering investigations involving other foreign
countries are often hindered by a reluctance in these countries to assist British investiga-
tors or by a banking system which prevents access to needed information, British drug-
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Additionally, British banks, like their Swiss counterparts, have made
significant efforts to curb money laundering. Reacting to the Basle Com-
mittee statement, 59 the Bank of England issued a letter to all banks in
Great Britain in late 1989.160 In this letter, the Bank of England warned
that failure to possess adequate systems to detect money-laundering
schemes would result in the revocation of banking licenses. 16' The letter
reminded the banks of their legal obligations to report suspicions and to
cooperate with law enforcement officials.162  The letter also reminded
banks of the "know your customer" principle advocated by the Basle
Committee163 which applies to the laundering of all criminal proceeds
and not solely those related to drug trafficking."
To supplement legal measures to curb money laundering, representa-
tives of the British Bankers' Association, the Building Societies Commis-
sion, the National Drugs Intelligence Unit ("NDIU") of Scotland Yard,
and British customs and law enforcement agencies were brought together
in a working group under the auspices of the Bank of England. 165 This
group, known as the Joint Money Laundering Working Group, was
formed in the aftermath of both the Basle Committee and the G-7 FATF
reports to develop guidelines for bank staff in identifying suspicious
transactions.' 66 Efforts by the group resulted in the issuance of new gui-
dance notes to British financial institutions in December 1990.167 The
enforcement officials have put pressure on the British government to conclude mutual
assistance agreements with these uncooperative nations. See id. Although British courts
themselves, historically, have been less than willing to honor foreign requests for confi-
dential bank information, this reluctance appears to be changing, and a shift in attitude
towards cooperating with foreign authorities is apparent. See Levi, supra note 144, at
119. In a recent case, a British judge ruled that the Bank of England, acting on a request
of a foreign regulatory authority, may require a bank to disclose documents despite a
High Court injunction to the contrary. See Trying to Catch up with Global Markets, Fin.
Reg. Rep., May 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter
Trying to Catch].
159. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
160. See Bank of England Hardens Stance on Money Laundering, Reuters, Nov. 14,
1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Bank of England];
Lascelles, Banks Warned About Controls on Money Laundering, Fin. Times, Nov. 14,
1989, at 28, col. 1 [hereinafter Banks Warned].
161. See Bank of England, supra note 160; Banks Warned, supra note 160, at 28, col. 1.
These systems are mandatory under Schedule 3 of the 1987 Banking Act, which deline-
ates the minimum requirements to qualify for a banking license. See Banks Warned,
supra note 160, at 28, col. 1.
162. See Bank of England, supra note 160; Banks Warned, supra note 160, at 28, col. 1.
163. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
164. See Bank of England, supra note 160; Banks Warned, supra note 160, at 28, col. 1.
165. See Home-Made Laundry, The Banker, Mar. 1991, at 5; UK Banks Under 'Gui-
dance Notes' Money Laundering Alert, Jan. 1991, at 1 [hereinafter UK Banks].
166. See Britain Says More, supra note 152. Suspicious transactions were defined by
the group as those which are "inconsistent with a customer's known, legitimate business
or personal activities or with the normal business for that type of account." UK Banks,
supra note 165, at 1.
167. Home-Made Laundry, supra note 165, at 5; see UK Banks, supra note 165, at 1.;
UK Houses Urged To Tighten Laundering Controls, Reuters, Dec. 10, 1990, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter UK Houses].
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notes establish standards and practices for the internal control and train-
ing of banking staff so as to avoid the laundering of criminal funds by
financial institutions.16 Recordkeeping requirements169 and suggestions
for verifying client identity 170 and monitoring overseas branches are also
included. 171 The notes advocate use of the "know your customer" prin-
ciple in banking relations. 172 The notes also describe common money-
laundering schemes 173 and review the laws and regulations which obli-
gate banks to prevent laundering. 74 Banks are provided with a sample
reporting form to notify the NDIU of all suspicious transactions. 1 5
In the summer of 1991, the Working Group issued revised guidance
notes to the British insurance industry. 176 These notes were issued to
assist insurers in detecting suspicious insurance transactions.'" The
168. See Home-Made Laundry, supra note 165, at 5; UK Banks, supra note 165, at 1.
The notes apply to branches of foreign banks operating in Great Britain. The head offices
of British banks with overseas branches were requested to send the notes abroad even
though these branches are bound by local laws. See UK Houses, supra note 167.
169. Banks should maintain account ledger records for six years and account opening
records for five years to aid investigators in tracking the source and destination of suspect
funds. See UK Banks, supra note 165, at 1.
170. Banks should obtain the true name, permanent address, date of birth, and nation-
ality of all new customers. See UK Banks, supra note 165, at 1. Preferred official docu-
ments for verifying identification include passports, armed forces or signed employer
identification cards, and driver's licenses. See id Birth certificates alone were rejected as
being too easy to obtain. See Bennett, Banks Hunt Drug Cash Launderers, The Times,
Dec. 11, 1990, at 23, col. 2.
171. See UK Banks, supra note 165, at 1.
172. See id; supra note 76 and accompanying text.
173. Regarding cash transactions, common schemes mentioned in the guidance notes
include unusually large deposits followed by a transfer to an uncommon destination, fre-
quent exchanges into foreign currency, use of different tellers to conduct large transac-
tions, or uncommonly frequent transactions by bank branches. See UK Banks, supra note
165, at 1.
174. See id
175. See id. In 1990, 1,700 reports of suspected drug money laundering were sent to
the NDITU by financial institutions. See Identifying a Launderer, Bus. L Brief, Jan. 1991,
at 12. Once notified of a suspect transaction, officials of the NDIU proceed to examine
criminal records and intelligence reports for leads. See Bailey, supra note 156, at 17. If
further investigation seems necessary, these officials will try to obtain a production order
from a circuit judge forcing the financial institution to provide the officials with account
information for closer scrutiny. See id.; see also Levi, supra note 144, at 114 (financial
institutions that refuse to comply with production orders can be held in contempt, thus
subjecting bank officers to potential imprisonment). The NDIU estimates that 20% of
the forms received result in the opening of a case or contributing to an ongoing case. See
UK Banks, supra note 165, at 1. Regardless of the NDIU's findings, banks which report
suspect transactions receive "Feedback Reports" on a quarterly basis from the NDIU
informing them of the status of the reported transactions. See id.
176. See UK Puts Insurers Under Money Laundering Alert, Money Laundering Alert,
Aug. 1991, at 7 [hereinafter Insurers Under Alert]. A third set of guidance notes for
financial companies, similar to the first two, was published by the Working Group in
September of 1991. See Bank Issues Guide on Drug Cash, The Times, Oct. 1, 1991, at 22,
col. 8. The most recent set of guidance notes has been aimed at "investment business"
which encompasses securities and investment firms. See Securities Dealers Latest Targets
of UK "Guidance Notes", Money Laundering Alert, Dec. 1991, at 7.
177. See Insurers Under Alert, supra note 176, at 7.
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notes inform insurers of laws and regulations concerning money launder-
ing and suggest procedures that the insurance industry may implement
to thwart laundering.17 8  Strict customer-identification procedures and
recordkeeping methods to be implemented by insurers are also delineated
in the notes. 179 As with bankers, insurers are told to adhere to the
"know your customer" principle. 8 0 The notes also list several "single
premium investments" ' that might be appealing to money launderers
and describe situations which should arouse an insurer's suspicion.18 2 As
with the banking notes, insurers are provided with a sample form to no-
tify the NDIU of suspicious transactions." 3  Although the Guidance
Notes to the banking and insurance industries include many of the provi-
sions of the EC Directive, the future of these notes is unclear since they
are voluntarily implemented and not a statutory obligation as required by
the Directive.'8 4
C. France
In addition to Switzerland and Great Britain, France has enacted leg-
islation designed to curb money laundering. In late 1987 and 1988,
money laundering8 5 and the international transfer of funds related to
drug trafficking 186 were criminalized in France.8 7 These laws were
178. See id. Although money launderers appear, thus far, to have avoided transferring
funds through the insurance industry, the notes were developed out of a concern that this
situation may change in the near future. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Examples of "single premium investments" mentioned in the guidance notes in-
clude "investment bonds, purchased annuities, lump sum 'top-ups' to an existing life con-
tract, [and] lump sum contributions to 'personal pensions contracts.'" Id.
182. Some of these situations involve occasional business requiring the insurers to
"provide an audit for suspicious funds," early encashment of "single premium policies,"
transactions where the source of the funds is unclear, or customers who are concerned
with the early cancellation of a contract but not the performance of the investment. See
id.
183. See id.
184. See Nowinski & Bagge, supra note 9, at 29. More recently, a committee led by
the former head of the Bank of England has proposed a voluntary code of conduct to
govern relations between a bank and its clients. See European Community, Thomson's
Int'l Banking Reg., Sep. 20, 1991, at 9, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File. The code, which might take up to a year to finalize, is expected to cover information
on banking privacy, loans, and accounts and is designed to eliminate the need for further
statutory regulation in these areas. See id.
185. See French Public Health Code, art. 627, § 3. This law made it a criminal offense
to contribute knowingly to the laundering of drug proceeds. See Zagaris & Bornheim,
supra note 8, at 121. Violation of the law is punishable by imprisonment for up to ten
years and/or fines up to 500,000 French francs. See id. Other provisions of the law allow
for the confiscation of drug proceeds upon conviction. See id.
186. See French Customs Code, art. 415. This law makes it a criminal offense to
knowingly conduct financial transactions with foreign countries involving drug proceeds.
See Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 121. Violations of the law are punishable by
imprisonment of up to ten years, confiscation of the proceeds in question, and fines rang-
ing up to five times the amount of these proceeds. See id. In investigating and establish-
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strengthened in July 1990 when the French government enacted a law
that outlined the duty to disclose transactions related to the laundering
of drug-trafficking proceeds.18 8 Pursuant to the new law, financial insti-
tutions18 9 have a duty to disclose the nature and amount of any transac-
tion that they have a "reason to believe" involves drug proceeds.190
These institutions are to report their disclosures to a group established
within the Finance Ministry which is responsible for further investiga-
tion.' 9' Institutions that fail to disclose suspicious transactions as re-
quired are subject to only administrative, not criminal, sanctions."9
The 1990 law creates a distinct duty for those persons who direct capi-
tal movements or who counsel or control others in doing so.' 93 These
"professionals"' 94 have a duty to disclose only those transactions that
they "know" involve drug-related proceeds.191 Those falling within this
category must disclose their findings directly to the Public Prosecutor
and may be subject to criminal sanctions for failure to comply.' 96 The
duty to disclose under the new law signifies a relaxing of French bank
secrecy laws that were imposed by Article 378 of the Penal Code and
Article 57 of the Banking Regulation Act of 1984.19' As a result em-
ployees and officials of financial institutions who comply with the law can
report suspicious transactions without fear of civil or criminal liability
for breach of confidentiality.198
The 1990 law also requires financial institutions to ascertain the iden-
tity of an account holder prior to the opening of an account.199 If the
account holder is not the person benefiting from account transactions,
the identity of the beneficial owner must be obtained." Furthermore,
ing a criminal violation of customs laws, French officials are permitted to rely on
cooperative assistance from foreign customs authorities. See iL
187. See Segal, Updating of the French Money Laundering Regulations, 7 Int'l Enforce-
ment L. Rep. 253, 254 (July 1991); Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 121.
188. See International Scene, supra note 153, at 5; Segal, supra note 187, at 254; Fisse,
France England Press Money Laundering Initiatives, Money Laundering Alert, July
1990, at 7. Also in 1990, French Market Authorities adopted regulations designed to
coordinate cooperation between financial institutions and law enforcement agencies in
investigating money launderers. See Segal, supra note 187, at 254.
189. Financial institutions under the new law include investment and commercial
banks, insurance companies, stocks and commodities brokerage firms, money changers,
pawnshops, and casinos. See Segal, supra note 187, at 254.
190. See International Scene, supra note 153, at 5; Segal, supra note 187, at 255.
191. See International Scene, supra note 153, at 5; Segal, supra note 187, at 255.
192. See International Scene, supra note 153, at 5.
193. See id; Segal, supra note 187, at 255.
194. In an official statement, the French Ministry of Justice stated that "professionals"
include notaries, auctioneers, bailiffs, auditors, solicitors, realtors, jewelers, and antique
dealers. See Segal, supra note 187, at 254.
195. See International Scene, supra note 153, at 5; Segal, supra note 187, at 255.
196. See International Scene, supra note 153, at 5.
197. See Segal, supra note 187, at 255.
198. See id at 257.
199. See id at 256.
200. See id.
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financial institutions are required to identify any occasional customer en-
gaging in a transaction greater than 50,000 French francs (approximately$9,000 U.S.).20 1 Failure to identify may result in the imposition of a fine
or forfeiture of the involved assets.2 2 Finally, in the event that financial
institutions find a transaction to be "complex or unusual, '20 3 or appar-
ently illegitimate, these institutions must retain detailed records of the
transaction for a minimum of five years after the termination of the rela-
tionship with the customer.2 4
D. Luxembourg
Long viewed as a popular haven for laundering funds, 20 Luxembourg
has taken measures to shed this reputation. Specifically, in the wake of a
scandal involving a Luxembourg-registered bank, the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI),206 Luxembourg enacted strict legisla-
tion in July 1989 criminalizing money laundering.20 7 Pursuant to the
new law, those individuals who knowingly conceal the criminal origin of
drug-trafficking proceeds are subject to a prison term of up to five years
and/or a fine not to exceed fifty million Luxfrancs (approximately $1.5
million U.S.).20 8 These criminal sanctions also apply to individuals in a
professional status who knowingly or negligently assist in the laundering
of drug proceeds.2z° In addition, the law allows for the seizure and con-
fiscation of laundered drug proceeds. 210
To prevent financial institutions from violating the new law through
the negligent handling of laundered funds, the Luxembourg Money Insti-
tute (IML)211 drafted a circular in November 1989.212 The circular de-
201. See id.
202. See International Scene, supra note 153, at 5.
203. See id
204. See id.; Segal, supra note 187, at 256-57.
205. See Kellaway, Financial Services Come of Age, Fin. Times, Nov. 16, 1990, at
Lux.IV, col. 1; Bank Secrecy Laws Stronger Laundering Now a Crime, Money Launder-
ing Alert, Mar. 1990, at 7 [hereinafter Bank Secrecy]; Council of Europe, supra note 20, at
7.
206. For additional information on scandals involving BCCI, see Note, Putting the
Super Back in the Supervision of International Banking, Post-BCCI, in Annual Survey of
Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60
Fordham L. Rev. S467, S478-89 (1992).
207. See Kellaway, supra note 205, at Lux.IV, col. 1.
208. See id.; Bank Secrecy, supra note 205, at 7.
209. See Kellaway, supra note 205, at Lux.IV, col. 1; Bank Secrecy, supra note 205, at
7. Banking and law are the two professions most greatly affected by the negligence stan-
dard. See Bank Secrecy, supra note 205, at 7. Bankers initially lobbied against the new
law, complaining that the imposition of a prison term for unknowing involvement in drug
money laundering was too severe. See id.; Kellaway, supra note 205, at Lux.IV, col. 1.
These lobbying efforts eventually died down, and banks have accepted the new law with
reluctance. See Kellaway, supra note 205, at Lux.IV, col. 1.
210. See Haar, supra note 109, at 4.
211. The IML supervises all financial institutions in Luxembourg. See id.
212. See id.
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fines the duty of due care to be observed by these institutions. 2 13 The
circular requires financial institutions to identify the beneficial owners of
new accounts and to maintain records on these owners.214 Financial in-
stitutions also are required to monitor their customers' accounts and to
refrain from any transaction which appears to be suspicious.21 5
Despite the enactment of laundering legislation and regulations, Lux-
embourg has been reluctant to relax its bank secrecy laws. Instead, four
months prior to criminalizing money laundering, Luxembourg strength-
ened bank secrecy laws through a national decree.216 Although strong
bank secrecy laws make it difficult for foreign authorities to obtain bank-
ing information, Ltixembourg recently has been more cooperative in for-
eign investigations against international launderers.217 In particular,
Luxembourg has assisted the United States by seizing bank accounts
owned by suspected drug traffickers and launderers.2 1 Luxembourg has
also supported international efforts against money laundering through its
participation in the FATF and its signing of the Vienna Convention.21 9
E. Italy
Italy also has taken measures to curb its money-laundering problem by
criminalizing the laundering of all illegal proceeds.' Censis, Italy's
state agency on statistics, has estimated that the total annual revenue of
organized crime is roughly $75 billion. 1 It is widely believed that the
213. See id
214. See id
215. See id
216. See id. The decree prohibits employees of financial institutions from disclosing
customer bank records to local or foreign tax authorities. The decree also applies to
employees of credit institutions and prevents information on individual deposit accounts
from being disclosed to parent banks. See id In addition, financial institutions cannot be
compelled to disclose customer banking information to national law enforcement authori-
ties unless it has been proved in a Luxembourg court that the customer is suspected of a
criminal offence under Luxembourg law. See The BCCI Imbroglio: Predictable... and
Predicted, Fin. Reg. Rep., July 1991, at 3.
217. See Bank Secrecy, supra note 205, at 7. Acting pursuant to bank secrecy laws,
Luxembourg bank officials have traditionally refused to honor requests for customer in-
formation from foreign countries unless the request was made by foreign law enforcement
officials working on a criminal investigation. See Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at
122. In a recent case, however, Luxembourg bank officials have been charged with violat-
ing the country's bank secrecy laws by initiating contact with and providing customer
information to foreign bank officials. See Gray, Court Threat to Bank Secrecy, Fin.
Times, Jan. 16, 1992, at 2, col. 1.
218. See Bank Secrecy, supra note 205, at 7. The accounts of both former Panamanian
dictator, Manuel Noriega, and a leader of the Colombian Medellin drug cartel were
seized by Luxembourg officials at the request of the U.S. See id
219. See supra notes 51, 84.
220. See Eurupdate, supra note 15, at 60; Eight Nations Join Financial Action Task
Force, Money Laundering Alert, Nov. 1989, at 7 [hereinafter Eight Nations]. Initially,
under Italian law, money laundering was a crime only if the proceeds had derived from
more traditional organized criminal activity, such as kidnapping, robbery, or blackmail.
See Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 121.
221. See Eight Nations, supra note 220, at 7.
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Italian mafia and Italian drug traffickers have infiltrated legitimate busi-
nesses and financial institutions in Italy.222 In response to these
problems, a law was enacted in July 1991 requiring all customer transac-
tions of more than twenty million Italian lire (approximately $15,000
U.S.) to be conducted through authorized intermediaries and by means
of easily traceable instruments.223 Pursuant to this law, intermediaries
must maintain a record of these transactions and are obligated to report
them to government regulators.224 This new law, however, appears to
have met with limited response from the Italian banking community.225
To improve this level of response, the Italian government is currently
considering a proposal that would guarantee anonymity to bank employ-
ees who report suspicious transactions. 226
III. COMPARING AND EVALUATING RECENT INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL EFFORTS
In their efforts to curb money laundering in Europe, both international
and European national fora employ a variety of methods. These methods
can be grouped into a two-pronged model for combatting money laun-
dering. This two-pronged model encompasses both the actions to be car-
ried out by national legislatures, courts, and law enforcement officials as
well as the duties to be imposed on financial institutions.
222. See Follain, Italian Banks, Under Fire from Rome, Pledge to Help Fight Mafia,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Nov. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Eight Nations, supra note 220, at 7; Parmelee, European Unity: An Offer The Mafia Can't
Refuse?, Wash. Post, May 19, 1989, at Fl, col. 5.
223. See Italy, Thomson's Int'l Banking Regulator, Feb. 3, 1992, at 9, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; McDonald, Major Launderer Charged Under
Italy's New Laundering Law, Money Laundering Alert, Dec. 1991, at 7. These in-
termediaries include authorized banks, post offices, credit institutions, brokerage houses,
currency exchange agents, trust companies, and insurance firms. See Italy, supra; Mc-
Donald, supra. The list of specified traceable instruments includes non-transferable cash-
ier's checks, credit cards, and money orders. See McDonald, supra.
224. See Italian Banks Pledge New Assistance to Government on Money Laundering,
Thomson's Int'l Banking Reg., Nov. 22, 1991, at 6, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File [hereinafter Italian Banks]; Follain, supra note 222. An intermediary is
obligated to report those suspect transactions that "leads the intermediary to believe,
based on objective criteria, that the ... transaction could be the proceeds of ... illegal
activities." McDonald, supra note 223, at 7. Included within the list of "objective crite-
ria" are transactions greater than twenty million lire. See id. Previously, member banks
were obligated under the Italian banking association's anti-money-laundering codes to
identify customers and maintain records for transactions over ten million Italian lire. See
Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 121; Eight Nations, supra note 220, at 7; Parmelee,
supra note 222, at Fl, col. 5. These banks were also required to register customers' pass-
book accounts, a common laundering device, and to terminate relations with customers
who refused to cooperate. See Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 8, at 121.
225. See Italian Banks, supra note 224, at 6; Follain, supra note 222. The Italian bank-
ing community has also opposed proposals for a centralized system for collecting bank
information because of the costs involved and a fear that depositors would then send their
money abroad to avoid surveillance. See Italian Banks, supra note 224, at 6; Follain,
supra note 222.
226. See Follain, supra note 222.
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A. The First Prong: Criminalization and the Power of Law
Enforcement Authorities and the Courts
The first prong focuses on the criminalization of money laundering
and the power which law enforcement officials and the courts must pos-
sess to effectively investigate and prosecute these crimes. Many Euro-
pean nations have been reluctant to develop statutes criminalizing money
laundering or to extend existing money-laundering statutes to cover the
proceeds from all criminal activities." European nations also have dif-
fered on the scienter requirements necessary to constitute a violation of
their money-laundering statutes." 8 In maintaining the spirit of the EC
Directive, these nations must work to enact legislation criminalizing
money laundering to the broadest extent possible.2 9
Even with broad criminal statutes, practical difficulties will still exist
in investigating and prosecuting money laundering within Europe. In
most European nations, financial institutions are required to provide law
enforcement officials, operating pursuant to a court order, access to sus-
picious accounts.230 However, these officials are frequently unable to
persuade a court based on their reasonable suspicions to issue this order
without first having access to the account.231 A remedy to this dilemma
would be to reduce the burden of persuasion required of law enforcement
officials. Yet, by providing law enforcement officials with easier access to
227. Only five EC countries presently have enacted legislation specifically criminaliz-
ing money laundering. See Eurupdate, supra note 15, at 60. As previously noted, France
and Luxembourg have criminalized the laundering of proceeds derived from drug of-
fenses, Great Britain has extended criminalization to cover drug offenses and terrorism,
and Italy and Belgium have extended criminalization even further to cover all criminal
activities. See id. Switzerland also has extended criminalization to cover all criminal
activities. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988) (the
United States has broad criminal laundering statutes which state that "[w]hoever, know-
ing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity.... [launders or attempts to launder this property] ... shall be
sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved
in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
or both."); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1988) ("[w]hoever... knowingly engages or attempts to
engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater
than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished... [by
fine, imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both]").
228. Some nations prosecute for negligent conduct, while others require a higher stan-
dard of intent, with knowledge often to be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
See Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 112. Cf Fischman, Cash Complexities; Federal
Laws Make Transactions Increasingly Convoluted, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1991, at 35, col. 1
(discussing scienter requirements for violations of United States money-laundering laws
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (requiring intent to promote the underlying illegal activity or
knowledge of an illegal purpose of another's transaction), 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (requiring
only knowledge by the person conducting the transaction of the illegal source of the
transacted fuids), and 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (requiring "willful conduct" in structuring a
transaction so as to cause a financial institution not to report a transaction or to report
the transaction incorrectly)).
229. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
230. R. Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 117 (1990).
231. See id.
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customers' accounts, the possibility of abuse of power and unnecessary
intrusion into individual privacy is increased.232 This risk may be mini-
mized by independent monitoring of law enforcement officials and stiff
penalties for those officials who abuse their power.2"'
Greater power also should be given to law enforcement officials in each
European country to freeze and seize assets pending prosecution once an
investigation reveals evidence of money laundering.234 Similarly, the
power of the courts to order the confiscation of laundered proceeds
should be extended to all European nations.235 The use of a European
financial institution to deposit or transfer proceeds derived from criminal
activity should automatically render these proceeds forfeitable.236
These practical difficulties are magnified when investigations and pros-
ecutions require corroboration between nations. International coopera-
tion is essential to effectively eliminate money laundering, and attempts
must be made to facilitate cooperation. 237 European countries should
increase efforts to enter into mutual cooperation agreements with coun-
tries which have not been cooperative in the past.23 In requesting finan-
cial information from other nations, European law enforcement officials
should be able to obtain access to this information without first having to
prove the crime.239 Law enforcement officials in Europe should cooper-
ate with one another in freezing and seizing assets that are reasonably
believed to be related to laundering activity. 24° Similarly, formal and in-
formal barriers to obtaining confiscation orders from courts in foreign
jurisdictions should be eradicated.241
232. For an argument against providing law enforcement officials with greater access
to customers' accounts, see Levi, supra note 144, at 122-23 (as a result of routine ex-
changes of information between British banks and law enforcement agencies, "the foun-
dations for the international finance-police state are being laid.").
233. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 230, at 157.
234. See id. at 195; supra notes 47, 61, 90, 152 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 47, 61, 89, 152 and accompanying text.
236. Cf 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-82 (1988) (allowing for forfeiture of criminal funds that are
deposited in or transferred through a financial institution as well as the forfeiture of any
property traceable to these funds).
237. "[Mloney laundering ... can only be handled on a multi-jurisdictional basis."
Trying to Catch, supra note 158. See also Hearings before the Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Narcotics and International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Terence M. Burke,
Asst. Administrator, DEA).
238. "The growing network of bilateral cooperation agreements . . . undoubtably
makes life more difficult for criminals and fraudsters." Trying to Catch, supra note 158.
See also Banoun & Lerner, As International Barriers Begin to Crumble, United States
Evidence-Gathering, Probing Get Easier, Money Laundering L. Rep., Aug. 1991, at 4 (as
more countries become willing to cooperate, United States prosecutors will be better able
to obtain evidence from foreign jurisdictions thorugh Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATs) and letters rogatory (letters of request)).
239. See R. Clutterbuck, supra note 230, at 195. Such access, however, should be sub-ject to judicial safeguards to prevent abuse. See id.
240. See supra notes 47, 61, 90 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 47, 61, 89 and accompanying text.
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As long as some nations are unwilling to comply with efforts to elimi-
nate money laundering, money laundering will persist. 242 Most Euro-
pean nations have been slow to develop or amend their legislation and
regulations to comply with international efforts to thwart money laun-
dering. For example, several European nations have voiced their opposi-
tion to outside pressure to sign bilateral agreements on the exchange of
bank record information.24 3 These nations view these agreements as an
unnecessary intrusion into their banking practices. 2' For those nations
that are protective of their banking sovereignty and history of secrecy,
the equitable distribution of confiscated proceeds among cooperative
countries ("asset sharing") should be promoted as a means of encourag-
ing these nations to join in the international effort to combat
laundering. 245
B. The Second Prong: Duties of Financial Institutions and Relaxation
of Bank Secrecy Laws
The second prong of this two-pronged analysis focuses on the duty of
financial institutions to "know your customer" and emphasizes the need
to eliminate the obstacles to disclosure presented by bank secrecy laws.
Under this prong, financial institutions have a duty to identify clients,
examine transactions, and report those transactions which involve or ap-
pear to involve the laundering of proceeds. This European reporting sys-
tem represents a rejection of the United States system to prevent money
laundering which requires the reporting of all transactions over ten thou-
sand dollars. 2'
242. Money launderers remain "'one step ahead' of legislation designed to foil laun-
dering efforts" by transferring their funds through less-monitored institutions and facili-
ties in countries that have strict bank secrecy laws and are unwilling to cooperate with
requests for banking information. See Global Money Laundering Rules Seen Needed to
Reduce Drug Profit Flows, Int'l Fin. Daily (BNA), Mar. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Global Rules]; see also Trying to Catch, supra
note 158 ("as long as there is any jurisdiction which lies outside the cooperative frame-
work, it will remain possible for sophisticated players to avoid detection"); Debusmann,
US. Wins Battles But No Victory on Drug Finances, Reuters, Aug. 31, 1989, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (drug traffickers can always turn to offshore
banking havens with tight secrecy laws to launder their funds). Many poorer countries
that are desperate for hard currency must compete with one another for needed funds
and are far from vigilant in examining not only bank customers but also the purchasers of
banks. See Levi, supra note 144, at 112-13. Corruption, commercial competitiveness,
and poorly trained bank regulators all contribute to this lack of vigilance. See id
243. See Council of Europe, supra note 20, at 7; see also US Sees Problems in Multilat-
eral Drug-Money Talks, Reuters, Nov. 15, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File [hereinafter US Sees] (as one British diplomat stated, "By no other means
[do] all other countries think the U.S. model is the right way to go.").
244. See Council of Europe, supra note 20, at 7.
245. The U.S. State Department has called for increased usage of asset sharing in order
to encourage foreign countries to cooperate in anti-money-laundering efforts. See Narcot-
ics-Related Money, supra note 115, at *13.
246. For an article clearly detailing the United States reporting requirements under the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 as amended by the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (18
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Although the compliance and administration costs may not be as great
as under the American system,24 a system of money-laundering preven-
tion that relies on financial institutions to identify customers and report
suspicious transactions presents its own difficulties. Institutions which
stand to lose business by tarnishing their reputation for confidentiality
have an incentive to withhold information or seek loopholes in disclosure
laws and regulations.248 Conversely, those financial institutions which
fear incurring sanctions for failure to report suspicious transactions have
an incentive to violate a customer's banking confidentiality unnecessarily
by reporting all transactions which are only marginally suspicious.249
For the European reporting system to be effective, financial institu-
U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957; 31 U.S.C. § 5324) and again by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5326), see Meltzer, supra note 5, at 232-41.
See also Rusch, Hue and Cry in the Counting-House: Some Observations on the Bank
Secrecy Act, 37 Cath. U.L. Rev. 465, 477-87 (1988) (detailing the voluntary duty of finan-
cial institutions to report "suspicious transactions" below the $10,000 threshold). The
United States system was considered too expensive and time-consuming to comply with
and administer, since it does not distinguish between normal and suspicious transactions
and results in the reporting of several million transactions a year. See Commission Pro-
poses Community Action to Combat Money Laundering, RAPID, Feb. 14, 1990, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Debusmann, supra note 242; see also Ham-
man, Banks Forced into the Front Line in the War on Drugs, Fin. Times, Nov. 1, 1989, at
8, col. 1 (noting the added burden of heightened reporting requirements for those finan-
cial institutions which are "targeted" by the United States Treasury because they are in
geographic areas with high incidences of money laundering); Geographic Targeting Rules
Create New Problems, Money Laundering Alert, Oct. 1989, at 3 (same). The unwieldy
volume of reports generated by the United States blanket-reporting system has caused
Europeans to doubt its effectiveness. Money Laundering Measures Approved, supra note
38. In the case of Great Britain, the author of a recent study on global drug trafficking
noted that, although the British reliance on the disclosure of suspicious transactions to
combat money laundering was not as "specific" as the blanket-reporting system in the
United States, the British system was "similarly effective." See Global Rules, supra note
242; see also Rodgers, Net Will Widen To Cut Money Laundering, The Independent, Dec.
11, 1990, at 18, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (U.K. government
stands behind decision to tackle money laundering through the reporting of suspicious
transactions rather than through a blanket reporting rule).
247. Naturally, however, there are costs under the suspicious reporting scheme which
must be borne in part by bank customers and shareholders. See Levi, supra note 144, at
122.
248. See R. Clutterbuck, supra note 230, at 117. See also Levi, supra note 144, at 112
(although they don't borrow money or make long-term deposits, "[u]ndetected money
launderers are good business for bankers.. ." because they provide banks with liquidity
and pay bank charges). Bankers often rationalize their reluctance to carefully identify
potential customers by acknowledging that, in competitive national and international
markets, these customers will simply take their business to other banks where the em-
ployees are less conscientious and law-abiding. See id.
249. "[A] careful balance needs to be struck between the interests of law enforcement
and the rights of bank customers, and of the banks themselves, which should not be
forced into playing the role of policemen." The Limits of Confidentiality, Fin. Times,
Dec. 11, 1990, at 16, col. 1. See generally Levi, supra note 144 (criticizing justifications
for the death of customer confidentiality in Great Britain). Cf Meltzer, supra note 5, at
252-55 (in the United States, the mandatory reporting requirements under the amended
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 partially conflict with the restrictions on the disclosure of
banking information under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1988).
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tions must be held liable for failure to disclose suspicious transactions as
required.250 Policies on reporting must be clearly delineated within these
institutions, and internal controls and procedures to prevent complicity
in money laundering must be in place."5 Financial institutions that re-
fuse to implement these controls and procedures should face the loss of
their license or charter.252 Bank employees must be carefilly screened
before being hired and must be trained to detect large or unusual transac-
tions likely to involve money laundering.3 These employees, as well as
bank officers and directors, should incur personal liability for their fail-
ure to comply with disclosure requirements.' In addition, compliance
officers should be chosen to safeguard the detection and reporting
250. Compare Meltzer, supra note 5, at 243-45 (outlining criminal and civil liabilities
for financial institutions in the United States that fail to exercise due care in meeting their
reporting requirements) and U.S Banks Seek UK-Style 'Safe Harbor' Protection, Money
Laundering Alert, Jan. 1991, at 6 [hereinafter US Banks] (United States is only nation
which permits criminal conviction of a financial institution based on the criminal conduct
of one of its employees acting within the scope of employment) with Villa, A Critical View
of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 Cath. U.L Rev.
489, 490 (1988) (arguing that harsh penalties on United States financial institutions to
ensure compliance with reporting laws may be counter-productive because of failure to
distinguish between intent to violate law and negligence in observing law) and Hamman,
supra note 246, at 8 ("the price [for failure to comply with reporting requirements] may
be too high.").
251. See Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at Ill; Manuel, 'Due Diligence' Prevents
Problems, Money Laundering Alert, Dec. 199 1, at 1. But see Levi, supra note 144, at 119
(noting the difficulty of developing a practical and facile set of laundering policies for
bank employees at all levels without paralyzing banks' routine operations).
252. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. In the United States, a proposed bill
authorizing the revocation of the charter of any depository institution found guilty of
money-laundering offenses is currently winding its way through Congress. See H.R. 26,
102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
253. See Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at I ll; Manuel, supra note 251, at I. Even
a well-trained staff, however, may have difficulty in detecting money laundering when
launderers intentionally structure their transactions to avoid the suspicions of bank staff.
For example, in the United States, to avoid the banks' mandatory reporting requirements
for transactions above ten thousand dollars, launderers intentionally structured their
transactions to keep them below the reporting threshold. See Meltzer, supra note 5, at
233-35. The process was referred to as "smurfing" and usunaly involved one or a number
of persons going to different tellers or banks over a short period of time and making
deposits just below the $10,000 level. See ia at 233. Faced with the success of "smurfs"
in circumventing bank reporting requirements and the reluctance of some courts to hold
"smurfs" criminally liable, the United States Congress finally criminalized such activity
in 1986. See id. at 233-34; see also Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal
Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 U. Fla. L. Rev. 287, 304-26
(1989) (referring to 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (the anti-structuring provision of the amended Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970)); Fischman, supra note 228, at 35, col. 1 (same). Yet, difficulties in
detecting and investigating laundered funds that have been intentionally structured re-
main. See Welling, supra, at 339; see also Meltzer, supra note 5, at 235 n. 18 (referring to
United States Treasury Department proposals requiring banks to develop systems to fa-
cilitate the detection of "smurfing" activity).
254. Cf Meltzer, supra note 5, at 243-45 (under United States law, any bank officer or
employee who willfully violates reporting requirements is subject to civil (31 U.S.C.
§ 5321(a)(1); 31 C.F.R. § 103.47(0) and/or criminal (31 U.S.C. § 5322(a); 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.49) penalties).
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process.255
Bank employees and officers also should pay particular attention to
those transactions involving the use of international wire transfers. Be-
cause they are quickly executed and difficult to monitor,256 international
wire transfers have become an increasingly popular means of laundering
criminal funds.25 7 These transfers between financial institutions often in-
clude only the order to move funds and omit other transaction informa-
tion.258 To prevent international wire transfers from facilitating money
laundering, banks might require that these transfers contain other infor-
mation, such as the name, address, and account numbers of the customer
sending the funds, the customer receiving the funds, and any third-party
beneficiary for whom the transaction is being executed.2 59 Bank staff
could also be required to adhere to "know your customer" guidelines in
identifying the customer and verifying the legitimate nature of each wire-
transfer transaction. 2" By creating a profile of suspect international wire
transfers, financial institutions would be able to detect transfers of illegal
255. See Trends and Forces, supra note 69, at 111; Manuel, supra note 251, at 1; see
also New Money Laundering Guide; Compliance Officers Urged to Act, Thomson's Fin.
Compliance Watch, May 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (as
one compliance officer stated, "It is widely regarded as the role of the compliance officer
to make employees aware of the dangers of money laundering and to design defences
against such illegal activities"); Fischman, supra note 228, at 35 (in the United States, "a
compliance officer is necessary to understand the federal statutes, make sure they are
followed, [and] provide regular staff training on the reporting requirements.").
256. See Note, Recordkeeping and Reporting in an Attempt to Stop the Money Launder-
ing Cycle: Why Blanket Recording and Reporting of Wire and Electronic Funds Transfers
is Not the Answer, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 863, 864 (1991) [hereinafter Recordkeeping
and Reporting]. Compare Kerry Leads Senate Crackdown on Dirty Money; Proposals
Could Hold Serious Implications for All Financial Institutions, Money Laundering Alert,
Nov. 1989, at 6 [hereinafter Kerry Leads] (monitoring of all wire transfers needs to be
improved) with Bankers Criticize Treasury's Proposed Wire Rules, Money Laundering
Alert, Mar. 1990, at 5 [hereinafter Bankers Criticize] (increased monitoring of wire trans-
fers should be limited to funds transfers that are likely to relate to drug trafficking).
257. Wire transfers "have emerged as the primary method by which high-volume laun-
derers ply their trade." Meltzer, supra note 5, at 246.
258. See id. at 248.
259. This proposal was promulgated by the United States Treasury Department. See
id.; see also Focus on Drug Money, Report Urges, Money Laundering Alert, Mar. 1990, at
6 (United States Senate report calls for standardizing customer information on interna-
tional wire transfers). This Treasury proposal evoked near unanimous protest in the
United States banking community over the burdens, cost, and utility involved in addi-
tional recording and reporting requirements on international wire transfers. See Cost,
Utility of Wire Transfer Regulation Questioned; Broad Spectrum of Financial Institutions,
Associations Pose Opposition, Money Laundering Alert, Feb. 1991, at 6; see also Bankers
Criticize, supra note 256, at 5 (regulations requiring added information on international
wire transfers would be ineffective, unnecessarily burdensome, and difficult to implement
since laws in many foreign countries prohibit them). As the Treasury Department
prepares to issue its final version of these rules, bank officials now have reason to believe
that their complaints have been heeded and that the new recordkeeping regulations will
not be as onerous and costly as originally anticipated. See Kimery, Bankers Prepare for
Final Treasury Rule on Fedwire, CHIPs Transaction Reporting, Regulatory Compliance
Watch, Feb. 3, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
260. See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 248-49; Recordkeeping and Reporting, supra note
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funds with greater ease.2 6 1
The duty of financial institutions to report suspicious transactions
mandates the relaxing of bank secrecy laws. 62 Common sense dictates
that, without easing bank secrecy laws, financial institutions and their
employees who risk civil or criminal liability for reporting legitimate
transactions will be reluctant to make such reports.263 By preventing law
enforcement officials from obtaining information from financial institu-
tions, bank secrecy laws are a great impediment to combatting money
laundering. To remove this impediment, a "safe harbor" policy must be
implemented in all European countries to exempt these institutions and
their staffs from liability when a report has been made promptly and in
good faith.26
With this in mind, a well-implemented "know your customer" policy
may succeed in reducing money laundering in a number of ways. First,
potential felons may be reluctant to launder their funds knowing they
will have to identify themselves.265 Second, the investigation into a po-
tential customer's identity may reveal information that warrants an insti-
tution's refusal to conduct business with a customer.2 " Third, the
identification process provides the institution with information to deter-
mine whether a customer's transactions appear to be consistent with this
information and with customary activity for one in a similar situation.267
Fourth, and most importantly, criminal activity from which proceeds
available for laundering are derived may decrease as launderers find it
increasingly difficult to conceal their identity and the origin of their
fUnds. 2 6 8
C. Alternative Measures
In addition to the efforts previously noted, other measures that would
256, at 865; Senate Hearings, supra note 237, at 39 (statement of Earl B. Hadlow, Chair-
man, ABA Money Laundering Task Force).
261. See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 249.
262. See supra notes 33-34, 45, 56, 94, 109-113, 145, 197-98 and accompanying text.
But see supra note 216 and accompanying text (Luxembourg's refusal to relax bank se-
crecy laws).
263. In the United States, the possibility of civil suit or government prosecution
against financial institutions for reporting suspicious transactions discourages such dis-
closures. See Villa, supra note 250, at 506-08.
264. See supra note 145; cf US Banks, supra note 250, at 6 (noting under United
States law that banks which report suspicious transactions increase their likelihood of
being investigated and prosecuted by the government).
265. See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 239.
266. See i.
267. See id.
268. Compare Levi, supra note 144, at 123 ("there may be some overall diminution of
criminal activity as the barriers to entry into the international laundering game prove too
burdensome for many potential or existing players") with Bailey, supra note 156, at 17
(since each of the major players on the drug trafficking food chain can make more than a
two hundred percent profit on his or her investment, the economic incentive to break the
law can far outweigh any potential risks of detection or forfeiture).
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help to prevent money laundering in Europe should be considered and
implemented if worthy. One such measure is the creation of an interna-
tional monitoring agency with the jurisdiction and means to track and
investigate suspect transactions. 269 Another measure would entail a boy-
cott among European nations.270 This boycott would prohibit a bank
from conducting transactions with a foreign bank in a country that does
not have existing measures to fight money laundering and that refuses to
be inspected by a monitoring agency.27' A final measure to be considered
would involve the increased use of modem computer systems and ad-
vanced technology, such as bar codes on currency, to detect and investi-
gate illegal transfers of funds.272
269. See R. Clutterbuck, supra note 230, at 117-18; Trends and Forces, supra note 69,
at 112. This monitoring agency could be developed along the lines of FOPAC or
FinCEN. FOPAC, a French acronym for "Funds from Criminal Activities," was
founded as a unit of Interpol in 1983 to serve as a clearing house for international infor-
mation on the movement of criminal proceeds. See Interpol Becomes Catalyst in World-
wide Movement to Investigate Illicit Money, Money Laundering Alert, Jan. 1990, at 7.
FinCEN, an American acronym for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, was
established as a unit of the United States Treasury in 1989 to serve as a centralized intelli-
gence network for receiving and analyzing information on money laundering. See id.; see
also Narcotics-Related Money, supra note 115, at * 15 (FinCEN "has helped initiate cases,
obtain information crucial to investigations and forfeiture actions, and locate fugitives
and suspects"). Recently, EC ministers took a step in this direction by agreeing to estab-
lish "a Europe-wide police intelligence agency to be known as 'Europol.'" Hirschler, EC
Agrees to Set Up "Europol" Police Intelligence Body, Reuters, Dec. 3, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. This agency was formed to receive and examine
data on cross-border crime and would begin its work by focusing on drug trafficking and
money laundering. See id.
270. See R. Clutterbuck, supra note 230, at 156.
271. See id. The boycott could be enforced by each nation adopting currency exchange
controls that prohibit the transfer of funds to a foreign bank in a noncompliant country.
See id. The inherent difficulty in developing and maintaining a multilateral consensus to
boycott places the practicality of this suggestion in jeopardy. A proposed amendment to
the EC Directive that was later rejected called for the European Commission and mem-
ber states to be given the authority to order the suspension of international funds trans-
fers to countries outside the EC that are suspected of money laundering and have not
acted to curb this practice. See Banking: Parliament Called On To Adopt Amendments to
Money Laundering Directive, Eur. Rep., Nov. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, ALLWLD File. Under Section 4702 of the United States Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, sanctions are to be applied against financial institutions in specified foreign coun-
tries that refuse to negotiate in good faith over agreements to exchange bank record infor-
mation. See US Sees, supra note 243 (referring to P.L. 100-690). This threat of sanctions,
however, has apparently failed to intimidate these countries into signing an agreement
with the United States. See Secret U.S. Report Reveals Only One Other Country Signed,
Origin Univ. News Serv. Ltd., Dec. 13, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
272. See R. Clutterbuck, supra note 230, at 118. In the United States, one senator
proposed placing computerized bar codes on currency as an inexpensive and effective
means of tracking currency to apprehend launderers. Kerry Leads, supra note 256, at 6.
The FATF rejected the idea of tracking funds by the electronic "tagging" of currency as
being too costly to implement. See Graham, supra note 52, at 1. Sophisticated computer
programs are used by FINCEN to analyze banking records and data compiled by United
States government agencies. See Vorman, Banks Feel U.S. Pressure to Halt Money Laun-
dering, Reuters, May 2, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. Com-
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CONCLUSION
In implementing the provisions of the EC Directive and the other in-
ternational agreements discussed in this Note, the nations of Europe will
demonstrate their commitment to fighting and winning the war against
international money laundering. In following the two-pronged model,
these nations must act to criminalize laundering activity, to empower law
enforcement officials and the courts to freeze, seize, and confiscate laun-
dered proceeds, and to develop cooperative agreements with other na-
tions to facilitate the investigation and apprehension of launderers. Asset
sharing should be used to encourage resistant nations to cooperate.
In addition, European financial institutions must be required to imple-
ment "know your customer" policies, to identify the beneficial owners of
large or suspicious transactions, and to report all suspicious transactions
to the appropriate authorities. To this end, financial institutions must
adequately train their staff to detect suspicious transactions and establish
clear guidelines and procedures to prevent bank involvement in launder-
ing schemes. Proposals to improve the monitoring of cross-border funds
transfers, whether through wire transfer or otherwise, also should be in-
stituted. Finally, in reporting suspicious transactions promptly and in
good faith, bank employees and officers, as well as the institutions them-
selves, should be relieved of liability under existing bank secrecy laws for
disclosing customer banking information.
In implementing these measures, European nations must be responsive
to the need of financial institutions to remain competitive in national and
international markets. These nations also must be responsive to the legit-
imate desires of businesses and individuals who wish to preserve some
degree of financial confidentiality. By recognizing these concerns, money
laundering throughout Europe can be reduced most effectively and a
strong and unified market for European financial services can be
preserved.
puter programs and systems can also be used by regulatory agencies and financial
institutions to assist them in verifying the reliability of reported financial information as
well as the source of suspicious funds. See, eg., Due Diligence, 7 Int'l Enforcement L
Rep. 335, 337 (Sept. 1991) (use of computers to perform due diligence functions).
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